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Ying Zhu* 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF 
FOREIGN INVESTORS IN AN ERA OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The long-existing debate surrounding the environmental impacts 
of investment liberalism has been intensified by the rapid growth 
of an international investment regime, which now consists of 
more than 3,000 international investment agreements (“IIAs”) 
and more than 700 investor-state arbitration cases. Many 
scholars, states, and non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) 
fear this effective investment protection regime may intrude on or 
“chill” the host state’s sovereign right to regulate public 
interests, including environmental protection. An unsolved task 
for arbitral tribunals is to distinguish non-compensable 
legitimate environmental regulation from regulatory conduct that 
triggers compensation paid by host states to foreign investors. 
This article provides a methodology to solve this task by focusing 
on one of the most prominent standards of treatment in IIAs—the 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) Standard. The FET 
standard requires host states to provide fair and equitable 
treatment to foreign investors in their territories. Based on an 
examination of existing jurisprudence, this article analyzes four 
models adopted by tribunals in crafting the general threshold of 
the FET standard in environment-related investment cases and 
examines the tribunals’ diverse approaches to assessing the 
stability and due process of the host state’s environmental 
regulation. Ultimately, this article proposes a methodology to 
harmonize the chaos in jurisprudence: without specific 
commitments made by a host state to a foreign investor, the host 
state’s environmental regulation does not violate the FET 
standard, as long as the regulation is reasonable to achieve a 
genuine environmental protection objective and is applied non-
discriminatorily and with due process. 
320 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 58 
INTRODUCTION 
The long-existing debate1 surrounding the environmental impacts of 
investment liberalism has been intensified by the rapid growth of an international 
investment regime, which now consists of more than 3,000 international investment 
agreements (“IIAs”) and more than 700 investor-state arbitration cases.2 This 
regime provides substantive and procedural protection to foreign investments under 
international law: states are required to accord national treatment, most-favored-
nation treatment, and fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors; states are 
also prohibited from expropriation or activities “tantamount to expropriation” 
unless prompt, adequate and effective compensation is provided to foreign 
investors.3 If the host state breaches these substantive obligations, the foreign 
investor may bring claims against the host state before an international arbitral 
tribunal.4 Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing number of investment 
arbitration cases in which states’ environmental regulations have been claimed as a 
violation of international investment obligations. As a result, many scholars,5 
states,6 and NGOs7 fear that this effective investment protection regime may 
 
       * Assistant Professor, Renmin University of China Law School. I owe a debt of gratitude to W. 
Michael Reisman, David Singh Grewal, Nicholas A. Robinson, Daniel C. Esty, Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Ian Ayres, James Tierney, as well as participants in the Yale Law School Doctoral Workshop, for their 
thoughtful comments and suggestions. Thanks to the editors of the Natural Resources Journal, 
especially Selena Sauer and Amanda Miera. 
        1.  The environmental impacts of foreign direct investments remain controversial. According to the 
“pollution havens” hypothesis, profit-seeking foreign capital tends to flow to the countries with the 
lowest environmental standard and thus creates “pollution havens.” A related hypothesis is that 
countries tend to compete with each other to lower their environmental standards to attract foreign 
investments, resulting in a “race to the bottom.” Nonetheless, many scholars argued that these general 
hypotheses lack empirical proof. See generally Gunnar S. Eskeland & Ann E. Harrison, Moving to 
Greener Pastures? Multinationals and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, 70 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2003). 
 2. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, 111, 
114–15 (2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf. 
 3. These standards of treatment are typical provisions in most bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 30–31 (2011). 
 4. This regime is known as the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism established 
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (“ICSID Convention”) in 1965. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention]. 
 5. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); David A. 
Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651 (2001). 
 6. The United States modified its Model BIT since 2004 to narrow down the protection of foreign 
investors provided by certain key provisions, including FET and indirect expropriation. The EU 
attempted to reform both the making and implementation of investment treaties, by claiming an 
exclusive competence of concluding investment treaties under the Lisbon Treaty, and by proposing a 
permanent international investment court in place of the existing investor-state arbitration mechanism. 
Some developing countries (including Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) took more radical steps by 
withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. For further analysis on the backlash against international 
investment arbitration in state practice, see Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under 
NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 45–46 (2001); Stephan W. Schill, 
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intrude on or “chill” the host state’s sovereign right to regulate public interests, 
including environmental protection. This chilling effect can be two-fold: on the one 
hand, the host state’s unilateral environmental efforts may be claimed as a violation 
of international investment obligations;8 on the other hand, the host state’s 
implementation of international environmental law may be claimed as a violation 
of international investment law.9 
One particular criticism of such chilling effect is centered on the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (“FET”) Standard. The FET standard is one of the most 
prominent standards in international investment law and arbitration. Today, most 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties provide FET clauses, and FET has 
been the most frequently invoked standard in investment arbitration.10 By 
definition, the FET standard requires host states to accord “fair and equitable 
treatment” to foreign investors in their territories. Although “fair and equitable 
treatment” is a well-known term of art in overseas investment protection, its exact 
thresholds and contents remain inconsistent and controversial. An unsolved task for 
arbitral tribunals is to refine the broad and vague FET standard to distinguish 
legitimate environmental regulatory conduct from distortion of foreign investment 
under the guise of environmental protection.11 
 
W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 875, 895–96 (2011). See generally MICHAEL WAIBEL ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION(2010). 
 7. See HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., NAFTA’S 
CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON 
THE ENVIRONMENT (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf; KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME? ISSUES OF SUSTAINABILITY (2000), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/investment.pdf. 
 8. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (Apr. 30, 2004); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/8, Award (Sept. 11, 2007); Plama Consortium, Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Award (Aug. 27, 2008); Yuri Bogdanov & Yulia Bogdanova v. Republic of Mold., SCC 
Case No. V091/2012, Final Award (Apr. 16, 2013); William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, 
Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton &Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Bilcon]; Adel A Hamadi Al 
Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award (Nov. 3, 2015). 
 9. See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000) 
(concerning the Basel Convention); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 
8, 2009) (concerning the 1972 Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural Property and Natural 
Heritage); Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can. UNCITRAL, Award (Aug. 2, 2010) (concerning, inter alia, 
the Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants); Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award (May 16, 2012) (concerning the Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles). 
 10. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
130 (2D ED. 2012); Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD 
INV. & TRADE 357, 357 (2005). 
 11. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L 
LAW. 87, 106 (2005); Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 7, 32–33 (2013) [hereinafter Dolzer, Today’s Contours]. Some commentators have 
submitted diverse and scattered proposals for solving this task. See J. Martin Wagner, International 
Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 538 (1999) 
(concluding that the host state’s legitimate environmental regulations that have adverse economic 
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This article analyzes the existing jurisprudence in which the state’s 
environmental regulation has been examined under the FET standard, and provides 
a methodology to distinguish non-compensable legitimate environmental regulation 
from regulatory conduct that triggers compensation paid by host states to foreign 
investors. Part I of the article analyzes the evolution of the FET standard in 
international investment law, and the new challenges for interpreting the FET 
standard in an era of sustainable development. Part II analyzes four models adopted 
by tribunals in crafting a general threshold of FET in environment-related cases. 
Part III examines the tribunals’ different approaches in examining environmental 
regulation under the subcategories of the FET standard. Part IV discusses the 
situation where a state’s environmental regulation is for the purpose of 
implementing the state’s obligations under international environmental law and 
analyzes the role of environmental treaties in FET assessment. Part V proposes that 
a host state’s environmental regulation does not violate the FET standard, as long 
as five elements are met: (1) there is a genuine environmental protection objective; 
(2) the regulation is reasonable to achieve such objective; (3) the regulation is 
applied non-discriminatorily; (4) the regulation is conducted with due process; and 
(5) there is no specific commitment made by the host state to the foreign investor. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FET STANDARD AND NEW 
CHALLENGES IN AN ERA OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
One of the several major obligations of state parties under international 
investment treaties is to provide “fair and equitable” treatment to foreign investors 
from other state parties. The emergence of the FET standard has been viewed as a 
response to the request for a stable investment environment by capital-exporting 
countries after World War II.12 Compared with contingent standards such as 
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, FET as a non-contingent 
standard, offers the host state less control over the standard of treatment for foreign 
 
impacts on foreign investors do not create the foreign investors’ right to compensation); Peter 
Muchlinski, ‘Caveat investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 527, 527–28 (2006) (suggesting that investor 
conduct be considered in the determination of FET to strike a proper balance between investor 
protection and states’ right to regulate); Jason Haynes, The Evolving Nature of the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET) Standard: Challenging Its Increasing Pervasiveness in Light of Developing Countries’ 
Concerns - The Case for Regulatory Rebalancing, 14 J. WORLD INV’T & TRADE 114, 142–45 (2013) 
(proposing to balance investors’ interests and developing countries’ right of regulatory change under the 
FET standard, mainly through drafting “clearer, qualified and more specific FET clauses,” taking “a 
more vigorous proportionality analysis” in investment arbitration, and taking account of “investors’ 
conduct in the calculation of compensation”). 
 12. Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Standard in International Investment law and 
Practice, 70 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 107 (2000). Many commentators linked the FET standard to the 
concept of rule of law. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J INT’L L. & POL. 43, 43 (2010) (proposing to use the concept of the rule of law to 
unify five subelements of the FET standard in arbitral awards, i.e. “reasonableness, consistency, non-
discrimination, transparency, and due process”); Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the 
Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE 
PUBLIC LAW 151 (2010). 
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investments and thereby assures a more certain investment environment.13 An early 
version of the FET standard appeared in Article 11(2) of the Havana Charter for the 
establishment of an International Trade Organization in 1948, assuring “just and 
equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought 
from one Member country to another.”14 
Although the Havana Charter failed to enter into force, this early model of 
the FET standard was subsequently incorporated into certain United States 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCN Treaties), with a reference 
either to “equitable” treatment or to “fair and equitable” treatment.15 For example, 
Article I (1) of the 1954 United States-Germany FCN Treaty provides the 
following: “[e]ach Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable treatment to the 
nationals and companies of the other Party and to their property, enterprises and 
other interests.”16 The subsequent 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on 
Investment Abroad and the 1967 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 
also refer to the states’ obligation to “ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
property of the nationals of the other Parties.”17 The FET standard was 
subsequently written into bilateral investment treaties, which began to grow in 
numbers from the 1960s.18 Nowadays, a majority of bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties have FET clauses.19 Even some Asian and Latin American 
countries that traditionally favored the use of national treatment rather than the FET 
standard for a better control of foreign investments, have incorporated FET clauses 
into their bilateral investment treaties.20 
Despite the popularity of the FET standard in treaty conclusion, there has 
been no uniform FET clause among investment treaties.21 In fact, the language of 
the FET clause differs significantly between treaties.22 Some treaties briefly require 
 
 13. Vasciannie, supra note 12, at 105–7; see also Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
International Investment Law 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 2004/3), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435. 
 14. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2178, art. 
11(2)(a)(i) (Mar. 24, 1948). 
 15. Vasciannie, supra note 12, at 110–11. 
 16. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 130–31. 
 17. Article I of the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad provides: “Each 
Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of the other 
Parties.” Similarly, Article 1(a) of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property provides: “Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of 
the nationals of the other Parties.” 
 18. Vasciannie, supra note 12, at 113. 
 19. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 130. 
 20. These countries include China, Malaysia, Thailand, Chile and Peru. See Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, supra note 13, at 2, 5. 
 21. Id. at 40. The MFN clause may to some extent help reconcile the heterogeneity of treaty 
language of FET. 
 22. For a survey of the drafting variation of the FET clause among investment treaties, see IOANA 
TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 15–52 (2008); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN 
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“fair and equitable treatment” in an unqualified form without further illustration;23 
some treaties link the FET standard to general international law;24 some treaties 
equate the FET standard to the minimum standard of treatment in customary 
international law;25 and others list specific examples of infringement of the FET 
standard.26 The drafting variation of the FET clause appears not just “between” 
states, but also “within” a state: one state may conclude different versions of FET 
clauses with different countries, which subjects the environmental regulation in that 
country to inconsistent FET standards.27 
The variation in language used in FET clauses has contributed to the 
diverse interpretations of the FET standard in investment arbitration, especially 
concerning whether the FET should be interpreted as an autonomous treaty 
standard or as the minimum standard of treatment (“MST”) in customary 
 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, 17–35 (2012) 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf. 
 23. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of 
Tajikistan on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 3, Feb. 12, 2009; Agreement 
Between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments and Protocol, Au.-Ar., art. 4, Aug. 23, 1995. 
 24. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government 
of the Sultanate of Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cr.-Om., art. 3(2), 
May 4, 2009; Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 25. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. In 2001, the Free Trade Commission under the NAFTA issued 
its binding Notes of Interpretation [hereinafter the FTC Notes], stating that “Article 1105(1) prescribes 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.” The interpretation in the FTC 
Notes has also been incorporated into other U.S. investment treaties. See, e.g., United States-Oman Free 
Trade Agreement art. 10.5, Jan. 19, 2006. 
 26. See, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 11(2)(a), Feb. 26, 2009 
(prohibiting denial of justice); Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Sultanate of Oman, Neth.-Oman, art 2(2) 
(2009) (prohibiting discriminatory measures). 
 27. Take Chinese BITs currently in force for example. Article 3(1) of the 2005 China-Spain BIT 
succinctly provides that: “Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall all the time be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.” Agreement 
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Spain on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, China-Spain, art. 3(1), Nov. 14, 2005. On the other hand, Article 5 of the 
2011 China-Uzbekistan BIT specifies the components of the FET standard, preventing states from 
willfully rejecting foreign investors from “fairly judicial proceedings” and from treating foreign 
investors “with obvious discriminatory or arbitrary measures.” Agreement Between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, China-Uzb., art. 5, Apr. 19, 2011. By contrast, Article 4 of the 2012 China-Canada BIT 
refers the FET standard to the international law concept of minimum standard of treatment, stating that 
the FET standard does not “require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as evidenced by general State practice 
accepted as law.” Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Goverment of the People’s 
Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investmnets, Can.-China, art. 4, Sept. 
19, 2012. Since these treaties employ inconsistent standards of fairness, a particular Chinese 
environmental measure may be seen as “fair and equitable” under one treaty but as “unfair or 
inequitable” under another. 
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international law (“CIL”).28 Some cases are relatively easy because they involve 
treaties that specifically link the FET standard to the MST in CIL, although the 
exact threshold of the MST needs to be further defined. For example, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) jurisprudence, after the issuance of 
the FTC Note of Interpretation of the treaty that explicitly states that the FET 
clause reflects the MST, consistently equated the FET standard with the MST 
requirement.29 On the other hand, some treaties refer to “international law” in a 
general way or refrain from mentioning international law in their FET clauses. In 
such cases, the tribunals have adopted two different approaches: for the first 
approach, some tribunals interpreted the FET clause as an autonomous treaty 
standard different from the MST.30 Other tribunals, adopting the second approach, 
held that an autonomous interpretation of the FET standard “is not different from” 
or “is not materially different from” the MST in CIL.31 
Another reason for the inconsistent jurisprudence of the FET standard is 
the generality and vagueness of the terms “fair” and “equitable.” The FET standard 
has an inherent nature of broadness and impreciseness, which is designed on 
purpose: the very function of the FET standard is to prevent governmental acts that 
are inconsistent with the objective of the BIT but are not covered by other specific 
standards.32 Since most investment treaties do not specify the threshold and 
components of the FET standard, international investment tribunals have relatively 
broad discretion to decide whether the host state’s treatment of foreign investments 
is “fair” and “equitable” on a case-by-case basis. However, neither the autonomous 
interpretation of the FET nor the approach of equating the FET with the MST 
ensures an anchored threshold of the FET. 
First, the FET, as an autonomous treaty standard, has been accorded 
different thresholds in investment arbitration. According to Article 31 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), the FET clause should be 
 
 28. Generally, the tribunals have tended to interpret the FET standard autonomously if the treaty 
does not refer the FET standard to the MST standard in customary international law. On the other hand, 
in the cases that the FET clause refers to the MST standard, the tribunals tend to follow the original text 
of the treaty and equate FET to MST. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between the FET 
standard and MST in international law, see MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM 
STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013). 
 29. Bilcon, supra note 8, ¶¶ 432–33; Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 
120–21 (Aug. 2, 2010); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 599 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 
2009). 
 30. Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶¶ 7.4.6 to .4.7 (Nov. 21, 2000); Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 292–93 (Mar. 17, 2006); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 254 (Sept. 5, 2008); Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Award, ¶ 127 (Dec. 27, 2010). 
 31. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 284 
(May 12, 2005); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 361 (July 
14, 2006); Rumeli Telekom A.S. & Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of 
Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 611 (July 29, 2008). 
 32. Dolzer, Today’s Contours, supra note 11, at 12. Christoph Schreuer also noted that the “lack of 
precision” of the FET standard “may be a virtue rather than a shortcoming,” since it allows tribunals to 
determine an infringement upon the investor’s rights “on the basis of a flexible standard.” Schreuer, 
supra note 10, at 365. 
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“interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”33 
In their ordinary meaning, “fair” and “equitable” mean “just,” “even-handed,” 
“unbiased,” and “legitimate.”34 However, as has been held by some tribunals, the 
broadness and vagueness of these terms make it hard to find an accurate 
definition.35 Thus, the tribunal’s interpretation of the contexts of the FET clause 
and the objective of the investment treaty has a significant influence on the 
definition of the FET. Although most investment treaties’ main objective is to 
promote foreign investments, the tribunals have adopted different interpretation 
methods: some tribunals have tended to interpret the objective of investment 
protection excessively, resulting in a one-sided interpretation of the FET and over-
protection of foreign investors.36 Other tribunals held that the purpose of promoting 
foreign investments should be interpreted in a way that balances the foreign 
investor’s legitimate expectations and the host state’s right of regulatory change.37 
Second, inconsistent jurisprudence with respect to the threshold of FET 
has also existed in cases where tribunals have equated the FET standard with the 
MST. Among those tribunals, there have been heated debates over the question of 
whether the minimum standard of treatment has evolved since the Neer case38 of 
1926. Some tribunals insisted that the FET standard is equal to the Neer standard 
that requires an infringement of foreign investor’s rights to be outrageous or 
egregious to amount to a violation of MST.39 On the contrary, some tribunals have 
correctly noted that the MST has evolved from the Neer standard and a violation of 
the FET standard does not need to be outrageous or egregious.40 
 
 33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
 34. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Award, ¶ 113 (May 25, 2004). The tribunal derived these definitions from the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English (5th ed. 1964). 
 35. Saluka Invs. B.V., UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 297. For an excessive interpretation of the 
ordinary meaning of “fair and equitable,” see Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003). 
 36. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 156; 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 113–15. 
 37. Saluka Invs. B.V., UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 300–09; Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 258 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
 38. The Neer case concerned a claim of Mexico’s lack of diligence in investigating and prosecuting 
a murder of a U.S. citizen in Mexico. In this case, the U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission decided 
that “the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short 
of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency.” L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 Rep. Int’l Arb. 
Awards 60, 61–62 (1926). 
 39. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 604–16 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 
2009); Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶ 390 
(Nov. 3, 2015). 
 40. ADF Grp Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 179 (Jan. 9, 2003) 
[hereinafter ADF],; Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 121 (Aug. 2, 2010); 
Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 115–16 (Oct. 11, 2002). 
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The vague nature and inconsistent jurisprudence of the FET standard have 
generated fear among scholars that the standard may be used by foreign investors 
as a “strategic offensive threat” against governmental regulation, resulting in a 
“regulatory chill” preventing environmental regulation.41 Some commentators have 
criticized the one-sidedness of the FET standard, submitting that the FET standard 
has been interpreted from the foreign investor’s perspectives, without due regard 
for the interests of other stakeholders such as local government, communities and 
environment.42 Other writers worry that the inherent vagueness of the FET standard 
may impose an unrealistically high requirement of “good governance,” such as the 
transparency requirement in Tecmed v. Mexico, that even the U.S. government 
might feel is difficult to satisfy.43 On the other hand, some scholars are cautious 
with respect to the environmental exemption under investment treaties, noting that 
a state’s actions under the guise of environmental protection may be motivated by 
political or protectionist purposes as much as or even more than by environmental 
objectives.44 The key question for investment tribunals remains: how can a proper 
distinction be made between the adverse treatment of a foreign investor by a host 
state that would constitute a violation of the FET standard and the host state’s 
legitimate sovereign right to regulate environmental issues? The tribunals have 
adopted diverse approaches in answering this question, as shown in the next three 
Parts. 
II. THE GENERAL THRESHOLD OF FET IN ENVIRONMENT-RELATED 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: FOUR MODELS 
The general threshold of the FET standard illustrates the basic benchmark 
against which the host state’s regulatory measures, including environmental 
regulation, are to be examined under the FET standard. However, the tribunals 
have reached no consensus on the threshold of the FET standard in environment-
related investment disputes. As shown in the table below (Table 1), a state’s 
environmental regulation may be subject to different models of FET assessment. 
 
 41. Howard Mann, NAFTA and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 387, 
405–06 (2000) (This early work noted that “[i]t is increasingly apparent that the private rights of foreign 
investors are being used not as a defensive protection against government abuse because an investor is a 
foreign-owned company, but as a strategic offensive threat to be wielded against government decision-
makers rendering or considering decisions adverse to the interests of the company involved . . . [T]he 
result is the creation of a strong ‘regulatory chill’ that is preventing regulators from taking steps they 
believe need to be taken to protect the environment.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Howard Mann, Is Fair and Equitable Fair, Equitable, Just, or Under Law?, 100 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 74, 74 (2006); Fiona Marshall, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International 
Investment Agreements, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY INVESTMENT NEGOTIATORS’ FORUM 16–17 (2007) , 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_fair_treatment.pdf; J. Roman Picherack, The Expanding Scope of the 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Have Recent Tribunals Gone Too Far, 9 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 255, 287–88 (2008). 
 43. See, e.g,, José E. Alvarez, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An Empire of Law or the 
Law of Empire, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 963–64 (2009). 
 44. Gantz, supra note 5, at 655–56; Roland Kläger, Revising Treatment Standards— Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in Light of Sustainable Development, in SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 76 (Steffen Hindelang & Markus Krajewski eds., 2016). 
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Table 1: The General Thresholds of FET in Environment-related  
Investment Disputes 
 
        
          Threshold 
 
Interpretation 
Method 
 
High Threshold/ 
Neer Standard 
 
Low Threshold/ 
Evolved Neer Standard 
 
Autonomous Standard 
 
 
Biwater 
Unglaube 
 
MTD 
Tecmed 
 
Minimum Standard of        
Treatment (MST) 
 
 
Glamis Gold 
Al Tamimi 
Bilcon 
Chemtura 
Gold Reserve 
 
A. The “Autonomous-Low” Model 
The Tecmed case and the MTD v. Chile case offer typical examples of 
adopting the “Autonomous-Low” Model, which means both tribunals interpreted 
the FET standard as an autonomous treaty standard and established a low threshold 
for violating such standard. 
The Tecmed case concerns the denial of an operating permit for a Spanish 
investor’s hazardous waste landfill located in Mexico. The FET clause in the 1995 
Mexico-Spain BIT45only generally mentions international law without a specific 
reference to CIL. Article 4(1) of the BIT states that “[e]ach Contracting Party will 
guarantee in its territory fair and equitable treatment, according to International 
Law, for the investments made by investors of the other Contracting Party.”46 The 
Tecmed tribunal held that the scope of the FET under Article 4(1) either results 
from “an autonomous interpretation, taking into account the text of Article 4(1) of 
the Agreement according to its ordinary meaning (Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention) or from international law and the good faith principle.”47 The tribunal 
did not refer the FET clause to the MST.48 Moreover, the tribunal adopted a low 
 
 45. The 2006 version of the Mexico-Spain BIT refers to customary international law in the FET 
clause. 
 46. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 4(1), Spain-Mex., 
June 23, 1995. 
 47. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 155 (May 29, 2003). 
 48. The Tecmed tribunal cited the Mondev award stating that “[t]o the modern eye, what is unfair or 
inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat foreign 
investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.” Id. ¶ 153. But this citation 
was used to prove that the host state’s bad faith is not required for a violation of the FET. The Tecmed 
tribunal did not go further to address the MST. 
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threshold for determining a violation of the FET standard, by imposing a long list 
of demanding requirements on the host states: 
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, 
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will 
govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and 
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply 
with such regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should 
relate not only to the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the 
resolutions approved thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such regulations. 
The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without 
arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that 
were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and 
launch its commercial and business activities. The investor also expects the State to 
use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the investment in 
conformity with the function usually assigned to such instruments, and not to 
deprive the investor of its investment without the required compensation.49 
The Tecmed tribunal held that this low threshold for violating the FET is 
not only in conformity with the ordinary meaning of the FET clause in the BIT,50 
but also in line with the intent of the parties to the BIT, which is “to strengthen and 
increase the security and trust of foreign investors that invest in the member States, 
thus maximizing the use of the economic resources of each Contracting Party by 
facilitating the economic contributions of their economic operators.”51 
The MTD tribunal has adopted a similar approach. In this case, the foreign 
investor claimed that Chile’s refusal to rezone a piece of land based on urban 
development and environmental protection had violated the FET clause. The FET 
clause, in this case, was Article 2(2) of the BIT, which provides that “[i]nvestments 
of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all time be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment . . . “ without any reference to international law. The tribunal 
noted that “there is no reference to customary international law in the BIT in 
relation to fair and equitable treatment.”52 Accordingly, the tribunal interpreted the 
FET clause “in accordance with the norms of interpretation established by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, which is binding on the State 
parties to the BIT.”53 It first resorted to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English to determine that the ordinary meaning of the terms “fair” and “equitable” 
is “just,” “even-handed,” “unbiased,” and “legitimate.”54 The tribunal then 
examined the object and purpose of the BIT using the preamble’s aims of 
investment protection and promotion. Accordingly, the tribunal held that “in terms 
of the BIT, fair and equitable treatment should be understood to be treatment in an 
even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering the promotion of foreign 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 154. 
 50. Id. ¶ 155. 
 51. Id. ¶ 156. 
 52. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Award, ¶ 111 (May 25, 2004). 
 53. Id. ¶ 112. 
 54. Id. ¶ 113. 
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investment.”55 However, the tribunal did not further illustrate this standard. Rather, 
the tribunal adopted the low threshold for violating the FET standard created by the 
Tecmed tribunal,56 by succinctly holding that the Tecmed threshold “is the standard 
that the Tribunal will apply to the facts of this case.”57 
B. The “Autonomous-High” Model 
As a second model, the Biwater v. Canada tribunal and the Unglaube v. 
Costa Rica tribunal have interpreted the FET standard as an autonomous treaty 
standard. Nonetheless, both tribunals blurred the distinction between an 
autonomous standard and the MST and concluded a high threshold for determining 
a violation of FET by reference to the cases equating FET to MST. 
The Biwater case concerned the termination of a contract where the 
foreign investor operated a water and sewage system in Tanzania. In this case, the 
tribunal held that, since the FET clause in the BIT does not refer to the “well-
known concept” of “minimum standard of treatment in customary international 
law” in particular, the Contracting Parties of the BIT “ought to be taken to have 
intended the adoption of an autonomous standard.”58 However, the tribunal did not 
resort to the ordinary meaning of the FET clause or the objective of the BIT in 
order to determine the FET threshold. Rather, the tribunal referred to arbitral 
practice. Noting that “the actual content of the treaty standard of fair and equitable 
treatment is not materially different from the content of the minimum standard of 
treatment in customary international law,”59 the tribunal examined both the arbitral 
awards adopting an autonomous standard of the FET and those awards equating the 
FET with the MST.60 Particularly, the tribunal cited two NAFTA awards, Waste 
Management v. Mexico and Thunderbird v. Mexico, to prove that the threshold for 
finding a violation of the FET standard is a high one, requiring “a gross denial of 
justice or manifest arbitrariness falling below acceptable international standards.”61 
The tribunal also took into account a series of pro-host state factors in the FET 
assessment, including: 
the responsibility of foreign investors, both in terms of prior due diligence 
as well as subsequent conduct; the limit to legitimate expectations in circumstances 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. ¶ 114. 
 57. Id. ¶ 115. Although both the Tecmed tribunal and the MTD tribunal interpreted the FET clause 
in accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT by taking account of the ordinary meaning of the FET 
clauses and the object of the BITs, their approaches have been criticized by the ICSID ad hoc annulment 
Committee in MTD as inconsistent with “the terms of the applicable investment treaty” and “different 
from those contained in or enforceable under the BIT.” MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A., 
Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 167. 
 58. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, ¶ 591 (July 24, 2008). 
 59. Id. ¶ 592. 
 60. Id. ¶¶ 596–601. 
 61. Id. ¶¶ 597–98. Although acknowledging that both awards adopted a MST rather than an 
autonomous treaty standard due to the special wording of the NAFTA, the tribunal held that the general 
threshold for violating the MST is appropriate in the context of the current BIT which has no reference 
to CIL. Id. ¶ 599. In this way, the tribunal seems to see no substantial difference between the thresholds 
of the autonomous standard of the FET and of the MST in CIL. 
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where an investor itself takes on risks in entering a particular investment 
environment; and the relevance of the parties’ respective rights and obligations as 
set out in any relevant investment agreement.62 
The Unglaube tribunal adopted a similar approach. In this case, Costa 
Rica built a national park for protecting leatherback turtles in an area where the 
foreign investor’s properties were located. In the view of the tribunal, either the 
autonomous standard of FET or the MST accords the tribunal the same 
responsibility to assess certain components of the FET standard, including 
“whether investors have been subjected to arbitrary or discriminatory treatment, to 
legal arrangements which violate due process, and in particular, whether the 
legitimate expectations of the investor . . . have been duly respected.”63 To assess 
these requirements, the tribunal had to “find the meaning of these terms under 
international law bearing in mind their ordinary meaning, the evolution of 
international law and the specific context in which they are used.”64 The tribunal 
noted the brief language of the FET clause in the BIT, which simply provides the 
host state’s obligation to “accord investments fair and equitable treatment.”65 It 
also pointed out the briefness of the preamble of the BIT stating the intent of the 
parties to promote foreign investments.66 Accordingly, the tribunal resorted to the 
previous cases, holding that “to prove a breach of the [FET] standard, a claimant 
must show more than mere legal error.”67 In particular, the tribunal cited the Saluka 
Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic award stating that the host state’s action or 
decision must be “manifestly inconsistent, non-transparent, [or] unreasonable (i.e., 
unrelated to some rational policy) . . . to amount to a violation of the FET clause.68 
C. The “MST- Neer” Model 
In the cases (especially the NAFTA cases) where the investment treaties 
link the FET standard to the MST in CIL, some tribunals have adopted a “MST-
Neer” Model, equating the FET standard to the MST standard in the Neer case. For 
example, the Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States case concerned the U.S. 
government’s regulatory measures against a mining company for the negative 
impacts of the mining project on local environment and culture. In this case, the 
tribunal held that the MST has been “effectively fr[ozen] . . . at the 1926 
conception of egregiousness” due to the difficulty in proving a change in custom.69 
In particular, the tribunal denied the claimant’s argument that numerous arbitral 
decisions establishing “a universe of ‘fundamental’ principles” could prove an 
evolvement of the MST. 70 The tribunal instead held that “Arbitral awards . . . do 
 
 62. Id. ¶ 601. 
 63. Id. ¶ 242. 
 64. Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, ¶ 244 (May 
16, 2012). 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 240–41. 
 66. Id. ¶ 241. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 245–46. 
 68. Id. ¶ 246. See generally Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award 
(Mar. 17, 2006). 
 69. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 604 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009). 
 70. Id. ¶ 605. 
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not constitute State practice and thus cannot create or prove customary 
international law. They can, however, serve as illustrations of customary 
international law, as opposed to a treaty-based, or autonomous, interpretation.”71 
Based on this understanding, the tribunal resorted solely to the arbitral 
awards referring to the MST (rather than to the autonomous standard).72 The 
tribunal first pointed out that the MST in the Neer case requires that “the treatment 
of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable 
and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”73 The question was 
whether this standard has evolved within the past one hundred years. The tribunal 
assumed two possible kinds of evolution: one is a “partial evolution,” which means 
the Neer standard has not evolved except for the change of international view 
regarding what is “shocking” and “outrageous;” the other is a “general evolution,” 
which means the MST has moved beyond the Neer standard.74 The tribunal 
acknowledged only the partial evolution of the MST while rejecting a general 
evolution. Particularly, the tribunal held the MST has not evolved beyond the strict 
standard established in Neer, which “is evident in the abundant and continued use 
of adjective modifiers [such as “gross,” “manifest” and “shock”] throughout 
arbitral awards, evidencing a strict standard.”75 In conclusion, the tribunal held: 
It therefore appears that, although situations may be more varied and 
complicated today than in the 1920s, the level of scrutiny is the same. The 
fundamentals of the Neer standard thus still apply today: to violate the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of 
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, 
evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall below accepted 
international standards and constitute a breach of Article 1105(1).76 
Almost the same rationale has been adopted in the Al Tamimi v. Oman 
case.77 This case concerned a termination of a mining lease and an arrest of the 
foreign investor because of the investor’s unlawful operation of a mining project 
against Omani law, including its environmental law. The Al Tamimi tribunal, 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 607–08, 611. 
 73. Id. ¶ 612. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. ¶ 614. The tribunal referred to International Thunderbird, S.D. Myers and Mondev. 
However, the reference to S.D. Myers seems questionable (at least according to the Glamis Gold 
tribunal’s rational that only those awards referring to CIL are relevant), since S.D. Myers was decided 
before the issuance of the FTC Notes that for the first time linked the FET clause in the NAFTA to 
customary international law. This misreading of the S.D. Myers award has also taken place in the Al 
Tamimi award. See Adel A. Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, 
Award, ¶ 382 (Nov. 3, 2015). Moreover, the Mondev award also cannot serve the Glamis Gold 
tribunal’s conclusion, because the Mondev award expressly stated that “[t]o the modern eye, what is 
unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious.” See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. 
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶116 (Oct. 11, 2002). 
 76. Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award, ¶ 616. 
 77. Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶¶ 382–90. 
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adopting the Neer standard, required the foreign investor to prove “a gross or 
flagrant disregard for the basic principles of fairness, consistency, even-
handedness, due process, or natural justice expected by and of all States under 
customary international law.”78 It also held that “[a]lthough a number of 
subsequent arbitral decisions have acknowledged that with the passage of time the 
standard has likely advanced beyond these basic requirements, tribunals have 
continued to employ descriptions which emphasize the high threshold for 
breach.”79 
D. The “MST-Evolved Neer” Model 
Adopting a different approach than Glamis Gold and Al Tamimi, the 
tribunals in Chemtura v. Canada, Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, and Bilcon v. Canada 
held that the MST has evolved from the Neer standard. In Chemtura, the foreign 
investor claimed that Canada’s ban on lindane products had violated the FET 
standard. The tribunal acknowledged the evolution of CIL as a result of the 
conclusion of BITs.80 Citing the Mondev v. United States award, the tribunal held 
that: 
[B]oth the substantive and procedural rights of the individual in 
international law have undergone considerable development. In the light of these 
developments it is unconvincing to confine the meaning of “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security” of foreign investments to what those 
terms - had they been current at the time - might have meant in the 1920s when 
applied to the physical security of an alien. To the modern eye, what is unfair or 
inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a 
State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily 
acting in bad faith . . . It [the term “customary international law”] is not limited to 
the international law of the 19th century or even of the first half of the 20th 
century, although decisions from that period remain relevant. In holding that 
Article 1105(1) refers to customary international law, the FTC interpretations 
incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped by the conclusion of 
more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties of 
friendship and commerce.81 
A similar approach has been adopted in Gold Reserve, in which the 
tribunal held that “public international law principles have evolved since the Neer 
case and that the standard today is broader than that defined in the Neer case.”82 
The tribunal also cited the Mondev award and Schwebel’s article to prove that the 
Neer standard is “far from what is fair and equitable” and is not controlling today.83 
 
 78. Id. ¶ 390. 
 79. Id. ¶ 383. However, this statement which might be correct in the Glamis Gold award was 
inaccurate at the time of the Al Tamimi case, since the Chemtura tribunal and the Gold Reserve tribunal 
have adopted a low threshold for a breach of the FET. 
 80. Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can. UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 121, 236 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
 81. Id. ¶ 121. 
 82. Gold Reserve, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶ 
567 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
 83. Id. 
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Although both tribunals in Chemtura and Gold Reserve correctly stated 
that the MST standard has evolved since Neer, neither of them has specified the 
exact threshold of the evolved standard. The subsequent Bilcon tribunal made 
progress in this regard. 
In Bilcon, a U.S. investor claimed that Canada’s environmental 
assessment of its project had violated the FET clause. The Bilcon tribunal, on the 
one hand, held that “the international minimum standard is not limited to conduct 
by host states that is outrageous. The contemporary minimum international 
standard involves a more significant measure of protection.”84 On the other hand, 
the tribunal found that the threshold for a breach of the MST remains high,85 and 
that “acts or omissions constituting a breach must be of a serious nature.”86 It could 
be assumed that the tribunal considered the threshold for breaching the MST as 
higher than a minor mistake but lower than outrageous behavior, with the exact 
threshold determined according to the specific context of each case. As further 
stated by the tribunal: 
[T]here is a high threshold for the conduct of a host state to rise to the 
level of a NAFTA Article 1105 breach, but that there is no requirement in all cases 
that the challenged conduct reaches the level of shocking or outrageous behavior. 
The formulation also recognizes the requirement for tribunals to be sensitive to the 
facts of each case, the potential relevance of reasonably relied-on representations 
by a host state, and a recognition that injustice in either procedures or outcomes can 
constitute a breach.87 
III. THE SUB-ELEMENTS OF FET IN ENVIRONMENT-RELATED 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
In addition to crafting a general threshold of the FET standard, the 
tribunals have also given content to the FET standard by incorporating several sub-
elements, including stability and due process requirements. Although these sub-
elements to some extent refine the broad FET standard, the question remains—how 
to interpret the stability and due process requirements of environmental measures 
to distinguish compensable infringement of investors’ rights and non-compensable 
legitimate exercise of states’ regulatory power? 
A. Stability of Environmental Legal Framework 
An essential element of the FET standard is the stability of the investment 
environment of the host state. The host state’s change of law or reversal of its 
assurances after the investment is made, which frustrate the investor’s legitimate 
expectations, can lead to a violation of the FET standard.88 On the other hand, 
environmental law is inherently dynamic. The subject matter of environmental 
 
 84. Bilcon, supra note 8, ¶ 433. 
 85. Id. ¶ 441. 
 86. Id. ¶ 443. 
 87. Id. ¶ 444. 
 88. PSEG Global, Inc., N. Am. Coal Corp., & Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirketi 
v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶ 191 (Jan. 19, 2017); El Paso Energy Int’l 
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 224 (Oct. 31, 2011). 
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law—the ecosystem—is by its nature highly dynamic and changes in a complex, 
nonlinear, and unpredictable way, which requires environmental law to be adjusted 
over time to reflect current ecological situations.89 With the constant emergence of 
new scientific information regarding environmental degradation, environmental 
authorities need to either tighten or relax the existing environmental standards.90 
This tension between the dynamic nature of environmental law and the foreign 
investor’s requirement of a stable legal environment has been seen in international 
investment arbitral cases. 
1. Stability Requirement of Environmental Legislation 
The Glamis Gold case concerns a Canadian gold mining company, 
Glamis, whose open-pit mining project in southeastern California has drawn local 
opposition due to its environmental and cultural impacts on designated Native 
American sites. The U.S. federal government denied the project’s Plan of 
Operation (POO) based on the “undue impairment” standard that was newly 
enacted in DOI Solicitor John Leshy’s legal opinion interpreting the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (FLMPA). The foreign investor claimed that the U.S. 
government’s acts had frustrated its legitimate expectations based on the well-
established “unnecessary or undue degradation” standard, the application of which 
would not have led to the denial of the project’s POO.91 
The tribunal agreed with the claimant that the shift of environmental 
standards “represented a significant change from settled practice and, arguably, 
surprised Claimant.”92 Nonetheless, the tribunal also recognized that the shift in 
U.S. governmental policy was due to the fact that the government was faced with 
an issue of first impression and one that might raise constitutional concerns, 
considering that “no previous—or subsequent—EIS for any mining project in the 
CDCA [California Desert Conservation Area] had found a significant, unavoidable 
adverse impact to cultural resources and Native American sacred sites.”93 
The tribunal pointed out that the issue before it was “whether a lengthy, 
reasoned legal opinion violates customary international law because it changes, in 
an arguably dramatic way, a previous law or prior legal interpretation upon which 
an investor has based its reasonable, investment-backed expectations.”94 For 
 
 89. Richard J. Hobbs, et al., Evolving Ecological Understandings: The Implications of Ecosystem 
Dynamics, in BEYOND NATURALNESS: RETHINKING PARK AND WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP IN AN ERA 
OF RAPID CHANGE 37 (David N. Cole & Laurie Yung eds., 2010). Also, since ecosystems often change 
in a nonlinear way, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to invent fixed environmental rules based on 
a prediction of future path of ecological changes. 
 90. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 22 (2004). 
 91. The claimant asserted that, under the old standard, its POO would have been approved as long 
as it employs economically foreseeable mitigation, even if such approval will result in the damage of 
Native American sacred sites. The tribunal also agreed that “it appears indisputable that, under the 
decades-long rule of the ‘unnecessary or undue degradation’ standard, mining operators developed 
expectations that the discovery of Native American artifacts at a mining site could necessitate 
mitigation, but would not lead to denial of the project’s POO.” Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, 
Award, ¶ 758 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009). 
 92. Id. ¶ 759. 
 93. Id. ¶ 760. 
 94. Id. ¶ 761. 
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addressing this question, the tribunal noted that “it is not for an international 
tribunal to delve into the details of and justifications for domestic law.”95 Rather, 
the tribunal used the Neer standard as a benchmark, holding that the M-Opinion did 
not violate the FET standard since it did not amount to “a gross denial of justice, 
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident 
discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons.”96 
Compared with Glamis Gold, the Unglaube case concerned a much 
subtler change in environmental legislation. In Unglaube, the investors argued that 
their reasonable expectations had been frustrated by Costa Rica’s interpretation of 
the language of the National Park Law.97 In 1995, Costa Rica enacted the National 
Park Law to build a national marine park where endangered leatherback turtles 
could lay their eggs. This law provided that the boundary of the park was 125 
meters “seaward from the ordinary high tide line,” within which the private lands 
would be expropriated to enable the construction of the park.98 Ten years later, 
recognizing that the terminology “seaward” was clearly used in error and was 
actually intended to mean “in the opposite direction from the ocean,”99 the 2005 
opinion of the Attorney General of Costa Rica made an interpretation of the 
National Park Law, which corrected the problematic word “seaward,” and thus 
incorporated the investors’ properties, located within 125 meters landward from the 
ordinary high tide line, into the expropriation area.100 This interpretation was 
subsequently ratified by the Supreme Court decision.101 
The investors argued that the 2005 opinion frustrated legitimate 
expectations that none of their lands would be expropriated according to the term 
“seaward” in the 1995 National Park Law.102 However, the tribunal dismissed this 
claim by according deference to the Costa Rican authorities in the interpretation of 
Costa Rican Law. The tribunal held that “under the Constitution and laws of Costa 
Rica, it is the Attorney General and the Supreme Court who are empowered to give 
authoritative and final interpretation of the law,” and “it is not appropriate for this 
Tribunal to substitute an opinion of its own or make any finding of liability unless 
 
 95. Id. ¶ 762. 
 96. Id. (citing the Tribunal Holding, ¶ 616). The tribunal found that the M-Opinion did not violate 
the Neer standard, for the following reasons: first, the opinion was made within the scope of the 
Solicitor’s power and foreseeable actions, and thus was not arbitrary; second, the opinion did not exhibit 
a manifest lack of reasons because of its detailed analysis; third, the opinion did not exhibit blatant 
unfairness or evident discrimination because of its general applicability; fourth, there was no quasi-
contractual relationship between the host standard the investor “whereby the State has purposely and 
specifically induced the investment”; and lastly, the opinion did not evince “a complete lack of due 
process.” Id. ¶¶ 763–68. 
 97. Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, ¶ 251 (May 
16, 2012). 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. 
 99. Id. ¶ 104. 
 100. Id. ¶ 91. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. ¶ 251. The investors argued that this interpretation unlawfully extended the boundaries 
of the park to the “75-Meter Strip” within which the investor’s properties were located. Id. ¶ 197. The 
concept of the “75-Meter Strip” was a subtraction of the 50-meter strip of public land that was 
inalienable under Costa Rican law from the 125-meter strip provided in the National Park Law. Id. ¶ 62 
n.27. 
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the Attorney General and the Court are found to have acted in a manner which is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or otherwise shocking to the conscience.”103 
2. Stability Requirement of Environmental Administration 
The host states’ adoption of a novel environmental review standard in its 
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”) may conflict with the foreign 
investor’s expectations relying on the pre-existing standard. In Glamis Gold, the 
investor claimed that the U.S. federal government’s cultural review of its project 
was discriminatory because the investor’s project was the first project to be 
assessed based on the novel concept of the Area of Traditional Cultural Concern 
(“ATCC”) created by the M-Opinion.104 The tribunal dismissed this claim and held 
that the “novel” use of the ATCC was justified because it was based on the opinion 
of qualified professionals.105 The tribunal stated that “[i]t is professionals such as 
these, with their technical background and expertise, not this Tribunal, who are the 
proper parties to determine whether, as Respondent argues, the use of the ATCC 
‘accorded with standard archeological practice, which calls for a reduction in [the] 
survey interval when a number of archeological features in a given area are 
identified.’”106 Although the experts produced by the investor challenged the 
technical accuracy of the use of the ATCC, the tribunal held that the respondent 
was justified in relying on the advice of the professionals, because “these 
professionals appear quite qualified for the task and they provided substantial 
evidentiary support for their conclusions.”107 
However, in Bilcon, the tribunal held that Canada’s usage of a novel 
concept of “community core values” in the EIA constituted a violation of the FET 
clause, because it frustrated the foreign investor’s legitimate expectations, 
constituted procedural injustice and was adopted in an arbitrary manner.108 This 
case involved U.S. investors operating a mining quarry and marine terminal in 
Canada, which failed to pass the EIA conducted by Canadian governments because 
of its harmful impacts on ”community core values”. ”Community core values” was 
 
 103. Id. ¶ 253 (emphasis added). 
 104. The ATCC concept was adopted to protect the interests of a local tribe. The U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management (“BLM”) retained the KEA Environmental, Inc. (“KEA”) to conduct cultural studies 
of the potential effect of the investor’s mining project. At first, the BLM instructed KEA to determine 
the existence of any “traditional cultural properties” (TCPs) in the project vicinity. However, the local 
tribe insisted that the project vicinity was merely a component of a larger area and that the whole area 
was sacred to the tribe. Due to such a “vast area of concern” by the tribe and the difficulty of confining 
it into TCPs, the KEA was later instructed by the BLM “to leave the boundaries of the TCPs open and 
instead evaluate the total ‘area of traditional cultural concern’ (‘ATCC’).” However, this ATCC concept 
was a novel concept that had no precedent in cultural reviews procedure. The claimant alleged that the 
novel use of the ATCC concept in the cultural review constituted a discriminatory treatment that 
violated the FET clause. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 103–04 & n.269 (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. June 8, 2009). 
 105. Id. ¶ 783. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Bilcon, supra note 8, ¶¶ 589–91. 
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a novel concept that had not been referred to in any Canadian environmental 
legislation.109 
Although the tribunal acknowledged the right of the host state’s 
“legislators to adopt different environmental assessment standards and processes 
than they had in place at the time of the Bilcon Project,” the tribunal found that 
“[t]he problem in this case is whether the Investors’ application was assessed in a 
manner that complied with the laws that Canada and Nova Scotia actually chose to 
adopt . . . [T]here was in fact a fundamental departure from the methodology 
required by Canadian and Nova Scotia law.”110 It seems that the tribunal would not 
have found a violation of the FET if the novel standard of review had been adopted 
during the environmental law-making rather than the law-implementation process. 
In particular, the tribunal held that the novel usage of the concept of “community 
core values” frustrated the investors’ reliance on the Canadian government’s 
previous encouragement of the investment;111 that the sudden adoption of the novel 
concept constituted procedural unfairness suffered by the investors;112 and that the 
environmental review was arbitrary because the environmental review panel 
“effectively created, without legal authority or fair notice to Bilcon, a new standard 
of assessment rather than fully carrying out the mandate defined by the applicable 
law.”113 
Foreign investor’s expectations may also be frustrated by tightened 
enforcement of environmental law. If the host state has tolerated an unlawful 
conduct for a significant period of time, the foreign investor may expect that that 
conduct, although unlawful ‘in book,’ will not be punished in reality. In Gold 
Reserve, Venezuela terminated the foreign investor’s exploitation concessions 
partly because of the investor’s failure to comply with the time-limits of 
exploitation provided by the Venezuelan mining law.114 However, the tribunal 
found that Venezuela raised no objection to the investor’s activities for almost 
twenty years, during which period Venezuela was aware of the process, approved 
required studies taken by the investor, and granted permits to the investor to exploit 
natural resources.115 The tribunal thus held that the investor had “good reasons to 
rely on the continuing validity of its mining titles and rights and an expectation that 
it would obtain the required authorization to start the exploitation of the 
concessions.”116 
 
 109. See id. ¶ 601. 
 110. Id. ¶¶ 599–600. This statement seems to contradict the tribunal’s previous opinion about the 
international minimum standard that “all authorities agree that the mere breach of domestic law or any 
kind of unfairness does not violate the international minimum standard.” Id. ¶ 436. 
 111. Id. ¶ 589. 
 112. Id. ¶ 590. 
 113. Id. ¶ 591. 
 114. Gold Reserve, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶ 
438 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
 115. See id. ¶ 578. 
 116. Id. ¶ 579. 
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3. Stability Requirement of Environmental Adjudication 
Novel concepts adopted in environmental adjudication may frustrate the 
foreign investor’s expectations. In Unglaube, the foreign investors alleged that the 
Costa Rica Supreme Court decision frustrated their legitimate expectations by 
introducing the novel concept of a “buffer zone.”117 As mentioned above, in 1995, 
Costa Rica enacted the National Park Law to provide a nesting habitat for 
endangered leatherback turtles. According to this law, Costa Rica was only entitled 
to expropriate the foreign investors’ properties within the boundaries of the park.118 
However, in 2008, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, in its 
response to a petition brought by an environmental NGO arguing for stronger 
protection of turtles, decided that the government should conduct a comprehensive 
environmental impact study in the park’s buffer zone (located within 500 meters of 
the boundaries of the park), during which time all the Environmental Viability 
Permits for properties inside the buffer zone would be suspended.119 
The investors argued that this decision interfered with their properties 
outside the boundaries of the park, which was not authorized by the National Park 
Law.120 The tribunal acknowledged the novelty of the concept of the buffer zone 
which “suddenly appeared in a Supreme Court decision” without being mentioned 
in legislation or endorsed by executive agencies.121 Moreover, the tribunal found 
that there was no scientific and technical basis for the establishment of this buffer 
zone.122 Accordingly, the tribunal “expressed significant reservations” with respect 
to the suspension imposed by the Supreme Court decision. However, the tribunal 
finally dismissed the investors’ argument because the investors’ rights were not 
significantly impeded by the suspension imposed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision.123 
4. Conclusion 
It has been widely accepted that the host state’s change of environmental 
law in the law-making process does not by itself constitute a violation of the FET 
standard. However, the tribunals have taken two different approaches to decide 
whether a change in the environmental law-implementation process, such as the 
adoption of a new methodology in environmental adjudication or in the EIA 
process, breaches the FET: on the one hand, the Unglaube tribunal and the Bilcon 
tribunal blamed the novel methodology employed in environmental adjudication 
and EIA for its inconsistency with the host state’s domestic law. The Unglaube 
tribunal also stressed that the novel methodology lacked scientific and technical 
 
 117. Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award, ¶ 251 (May 
16, 2012). 
 118. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. 
 119. Id. ¶¶ 78–79. 
 120. Id. ¶ 251. 
 121. Id. ¶ 255. 
 122. Id. ¶¶ 255, 231. 
 123. Id. ¶ 255. The tribunal found that the Supreme Court subsequently adopted a new set of 
guidelines which closely resembled to those set forth in the 1992 Agreement which the investors had 
approved and signed, and thus the tribunal was “not persuaded that the new [g]uidelines or the delay 
involved, significantly impeded or interfered with their property rights.” Id. 
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basis. On the other, the Glamis Gold tribunal accorded discretion to the host state 
adopting the novel methodology in the EIA process and refused to make its own 
assessment of the scientific basis of such methodology. 
Both approaches seem problematic. The latter approach, adopted in 
Glamis Gold, denies the tribunal’s inherent responsibility of assessing the fairness 
and equitability of environmental measure in question.124 The danger of this 
approach is that the host state may adopt novel environmental standards as a cloak 
for investment distortion purposes. The former approach adopted by the Unglaube 
tribunal and the Bilcon tribunal is also problematic since it wrongfully assesses 
environmental measures by using the host state’s domestic law as a benchmark. A 
violation of national law does not necessarily result in a violation of international 
law. As the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held in the Electronica Sicula 
S.p.A., U.S. v. Italy (“ELSI”) case, “[w]hat is a breach of treaty may be lawful in the 
municipal law and what is unlawful in the municipal law may be wholly innocent 
of violation of a treaty provision.”125 
A better approach would be recognizing the tribunal’s authority in 
assessing the fairness and equitability of the environmental measure in question, 
and meanwhile, obliging tribunals to take into account the dynamic and evolving 
nature of environmental regulation in such assessment. Novel rules in 
environmental legislation, administration and adjudication processes should not 
violate the FET standard, as long as they have rational scientific bases and are 
applied in a non-discriminatory way.126 
B. Due Process in Environmental Decision-making 
The due process requirement in FET is related to a traditional concept in 
international law—denial of justice.127 Although denial of justice originally 
concerned the administration of justice by courts, investment tribunals have 
 
 124. A similar approach was adopted by the Chemtura tribunal, which noted that the rule of an 
investment tribunal “is not to second-guess the correctness of the science-based decision-making of 
highly specialized national regulatory agencies.” Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, 
Award, ¶ 134 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
 125. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. REP. 15, , ¶ 73 (July 20). The Court 
specifically found that “[a] finding of the local courts that an act was unlawful may well be relevant to 
an argument that it was also arbitrary; but by itself, and without more, unlawfulness cannot be said to 
amount to arbitrariness . . . Nor does it follow from a finding by a municipal court that an act was 
unjustified, or unreasonable, or arbitrary, that that act is necessarily to be classed as arbitrary in 
international law, though the qualification given to the impugned act by a municipal authority may be a 
valuable indication.” Id. ¶ 124. See also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries, art. 3, Commentary 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001). 
 126. This position was adopted by the tribunal in Philip Morris, which held that the FET provisions 
“do not preclude governments from enacting novel rules, even if these are in advance of international 
practice, provided these have some rational basis and are not discriminatory. [The FET provision] does 
not guarantee that nothing should be done by the host State for the first time.” Philip Morris Brands Sàrl 
v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 430 (July 8, 2016). 
 127. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 154. 
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extended the applicable scope of this concept to include the host state’s 
administrative activities.128 
1. Independency 
The lack of independence of the environmental decision-making process, 
which harms the foreign investment, may lead to a violation of the FET standard. It 
would be relatively easier to determine a violation of FET, if the host state, as in 
Biwater, has promised an independent environmental decision-maker governing the 
investment, which has generated the foreign investor’s legitimate expectations. On 
the other hand, if the host state has not made such a promise, the question would be 
whether and to what extent the FET standard inherently requires the independency 
of the host state’s environmental decision-making process. 
In Biwater, the foreign investor, BGT, claimed that Tanzania had violated 
the FET clause by, inter alia, failing to ensure an independent Energy and Water 
Utilities Regulatory Authority (“EWURA”) that governed its investment.129 The 
foreign investor highlighted the fact that Tanzania had made a detailed promise of 
the independency of the EWURA before the foreign investor made its 
investment.130 The tribunal found that an independent regulator was critical and 
essential to the foreign investment and that the independence of the regulator was 
an important factor that was considered by BGT when it decided to invest in 
Tanzania.131 The tribunal also noted that Tanzania’s failure to appoint an 
independent regulator was due to political reasons.132 Accordingly, the tribunal 
held that: “[i]n the Arbitral Tribunal’s view, as a matter of principle, the failure to 
put in place an independent, impartial regulator, insulated from political influence, 
constitutes a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, in that it represents 
a departure from [the investor]’s legitimate expectations that an impartial regulator 
would be established.”133 
 
 128. Id. at 156. See Rumeli Telekom A.S. & Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. 
Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 623 (July 29, 2008); Middle E. Cement 
Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 143 
(Apr. 12, 2002); see also AES Summit Generation Ltd. & AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. Republic of Hung., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22AES, Award, ¶ 9.3.40 (Sept. 23, 2010). 
 129. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, ¶ 535 (July 24, 2008). 
 130. In 2001, prior to the foreign investor BGT’s investment, Tanzania enacted an Act (“EWURA 
Act”) to establish a new authority—the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority 
(“EWURA”)—to govern the regulation of energy and water utilities. The EWURA Act ensured the 
independence of the EWURA in several respects: first, the EWURA “was to be governed by a Board of 
Directors consisting of seven members, rather than a sole decision maker”; second, the appointment of 
the Board of Directors should be scrutinized by a nomination committee, and should include 
consultation with industry organizations, chambers of commerce and specialist consultants; third, the 
members of the Board of Directors should not be any offices that may impinge on their political 
impartiality. Id. ¶ 537. 
 131. Id. ¶¶ 608–09. 
 132. Id. ¶ 610. 
 133. Id. ¶ 615. However, the tribunal subsequently found that Tanzania’s breach of the FET standard 
“had no negative impact on BGT,” because the Minister of the EWURA, as Interim Regulator, complied 
with the duties under the EWURA Act and he conducted those duties in good faith. Therefore, the 
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In Bilcon, the foreign investor argued that Canada failed to appoint 
members of the environmental assessment panel who should have been “unbiased 
and free from any conflict of interest relative to the project,” because two of the 
panel members had previously been involved in a local environmental advocacy 
group, and the third panel member had academic interest in greater community 
participation.134 However, the tribunal found that these arguments only provided a 
possible explanatory context for the decision of the environmental panel,135 and 
that “the evidence d[id] not demonstrate that Canada’s choice of Panel members 
was improper under either domestic or international standards.”136 
In Gold Reserve, Venezuela terminated two concessions of the foreign 
investment based on “internal memoranda analyzing the state of the 
concessionaire’s compliance, prepared by the same officials on exactly the same 
dates.”137 The tribunal held “[t]he need to terminate the two Concessions 
expeditiously as a part of the same process led Respondent to deny Claimant’s due 
process rights by failing to initiate a specific administrative procedure to revoke the 
extension of the two Concessions, thus violating the FET standard also in that 
regard.”138 
2. Delay 
Foreign investors may argue that a delay in the host state’s environmental 
decision-making process constitutes a violation of the FET standard. The tribunals 
examining this argument have adopted different approaches. 
In Gold Reserve, the tribunal held that the host state’s delay in granting 
the investor the required environmental permits was contrary to the FET standard. 
In this case, the investor’s mining concessions were terminated according to 
Venezuelan Mining Law because the investor failed to commence exploitation 
within seven years. The tribunal succinctly held that the delay by the Venezuelan 
environmental authorities to grant environmental permits “made it difficult for 
Claimant to comply with the time periods prescribed by the corresponding Mining 
Law and the Mining Title,” and such failure was “contrary to the BIT standard.”139 
 
tribunal concluded that the absence of an independent regulator did not breach the FET provision. Id. ¶¶ 
616–21. 
 134. Bilcon, supra note 8, ¶¶ 370, 491. The claimant also argued that the Chair of the Panel, Dr. 
Fournier, had also chaired the panel in a previous case in which Dr. Fournier had a negative attitude 
towards the “community value” argument. An expert retained by the investor testified that he had “heard 
it said” that the Ecology Action Centre’s criticism to Dr. Fournier’s approach in that previous case 
might have influenced Dr. Fournier to adopt a different approach in the Bilcon case. However, the 
tribunal denied this argument for lack of evidence proving a link between the criticism of the previous 
case and Dr. Fournier’s approach concerning Bilcon. Id. ¶ 495. 
 135. Id. ¶ 496. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Gold Reserve, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶ 
614 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. ¶ 608. 
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In contrast to Gold Reserve, the tribunals in Glamis Gold and Bilcon took 
into account the complexity of administration in determining whether the delay in 
environmental regulatory process amounted to a violation of the FET standard.140 
In Glamis Gold, the foreign investor asserted that the United States 
violated the FET standard partly because of the delay in the review process of the 
investor’s mining project.141 Although admitting that the review process took 
longer time than usual,142 the tribunal held that this protracted process could be 
justified by the particular circumstances it concerned: “this was a particularly 
complicated, contested issue in which numerous parties took an interest and the 
federal government was quite aware of the likelihood, if not imminence, of 
litigation and therefore its need to be extraordinarily careful in its review and 
decision-making processes.”143 
The tribunal also expressed sympathy for the U.S. federal government’s 
suspension of the review process after the investor filed its Notice of Intent in the 
arbitration. It held that “the Tribunal does not find that such a failure of a 
governmental body to diligently pursue administrative review while also defending 
an arbitration with respect to that same review is manifestly arbitrary, completely 
lacking in due process, exhibiting evident discrimination, or manifestly lacking in 
reasons.”144 
The Bilcon tribunal also accorded deference to the domestic agencies 
dealing with complex regulation. In Bilcon, the investor argued that the Bilcon 
project had experienced a delay in the environmental regulatory process compared 
with other similar projects.145 The tribunal concluded that delays as “imprudent 
exercise of discretion or even outright mistakes” do not amount to a breach of the 
international minimum standard.146 
 
 140. This approach is not surprising since both tribunals adopted a high threshold for violating the 
FET standard, while the Gold Reserve tribunal adopted a low one. The Glamis Gold tribunal considered 
the Neer standard still applies today, although notions have changed with respect to the definition of 
“outrageous.” Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 22 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009). 
Although the Bilcon tribunal acknowledged that the international minimum standard has evolved 
towards an increased investor protection, it still held that there is a high threshold for the FET standard 
to apply and that “[a]cts or omissions constituting a breach must be of a serious nature.” Bilcon, supra 
note 8, ¶¶ 438–44. On the other hand, in Gold Reserve, the tribunal refused to apply the Neer standard, 
stating that “public international law principles have evolved since the Neer case and that the standard 
today is broader than that defined in the Neer case on which Respondent relies.” Gold Reserve, Inc., 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶ 567. 
 141. Glamis Gold, Ltd., Award, ¶ 773. 
 142. The review process had lasted for nine years before suspended by the U.S. federal government 
in 2003 (at which time the investor filed its Notice of Intent for arbitration). The investor pointed out 
that this process was more protracted compared with the two to three-year average time for such review. 
Id. ¶¶ 773–74. Nonetheless, the tribunal noted that “the process was proceeding diligently, albeit 
perhaps a little slowly.” Id. ¶ 774. 
 143. Id. ¶ 774. 
 144. Id. ¶ 776. 
 145. Bilcon, supra note 8, ¶ 391. 
 146. As the tribunal stated “[m]odern regulatory and social welfare states tackle complex problems. 
Not all situations can be addressed in advance by the laws that are enacted. Room must be left for 
judgment to be used to interpret legal standards and apply them to the facts. Even when state officials 
are acting in good faith there will sometimes be not only controversial judgments, but clear-cut mistakes 
in following procedures, gathering and stating facts and identifying the applicable substantive rules. 
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However, neither the Glamis Gold tribunal nor the Bilcon tribunal 
specified to what extent deference should be accorded to the host state. Too much 
deference accorded to the host state might result in a failure to protect the 
investor’s interests under the investment treaties. For example, in Glamis Gold, the 
investor was subject to a nine-year environmental review which was normally two 
or three years on average. The tribunal summarily held that the review, which was 
conducted “perhaps a little slowly,” could be justified by the complicated situation 
faced by the host state. The tribunal neither made a careful examination of the 
impact of the delay nor did it examine whether the situation was so complicated 
that the environmental authorities had to spend nine years to solve it. Such a simple 
justification based on the complexity of environmental administration might 
provide a disguise for a host state that has violated its obligations under 
international investment law. 
Compared with the tribunals in Glamis Gold and Bilcon, the Chemtura 
tribunal took more criteria into consideration when deciding whether the delay by 
the environmental authority in the process of the registration of the foreign 
investor’s products breached the FET standard. The Chemtura tribunal first noted 
that the delayed registration process was conducted in good faith, which “is the 
general context in which the delays identified by the Claimant must be 
assessed.”147 The tribunal also found that the responsibility for the delays was 
attributed to both parties: on the one hand, the investor’s initial application was 
incomplete, and on the other hand, the host state’s queuing period was excessively 
long.148 Moreover, the tribunal compared the evaluation time in the host state and 
that in the investor’s home state. After a comparison between the evaluation 
procedure between the United States and Canada, the tribunal found that “the time 
used by the PMRA [Pest Management Regulatory Agency (of Canada)] for the 
evaluation . . . was not fundamentally different from that used by the EPA.”149 
Finally, the tribunal examined the actual impact of the delay on the foreign 
investment. The tribunal held that “[o]ne might further think of measuring the 
materiality of the delays by looking at their economic impact.”150 However, “[t]his 
avenue leads nowhere,” because “[t]he Claimant claims no independent damages 
on this account.”151 
Thus, the Chemtura tribunal examined the issue of “delay” by taking into 
account various criteria, including not only the impact of the delay on the 
investment (as in Gold Reserve) and the complexity of the host state’s 
administration (as in Glamis Gold and Bilcon), but also the intent of the host state, 
the responsibility of the investor for the delay, and a comparison between the 
review processes in the host state and that in the investor’s home state. Compared 
 
State authorities are faced with competing demands on their administrative resources and there can be 
delays or limited time, attention and expertise brought to bear in dealing with issues. The imprudent 
exercise of discretion or even outright mistakes do not, as a rule, lead to a breach of the international 
minimum standard.” Id. ¶ 437. 
 147. Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can. UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 216 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
 148. Id. ¶ 218. 
 149. Id. ¶ 220. 
 150. Id. ¶ 223. 
 151. Id. 
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to other cases, the comprehensive analysis adopted in Chemtura is a better 
approach because it cannot achieve justice either by absolutely prohibiting delay in 
the environmental decision-making process or by according unlimited deference to 
the host state’s environmental administration. 
3. Right to be Heard 
The protection of the foreign investor’s right to be heard, as a due process 
issue, is closely related to the transparency requirement and the host state’s 
obligation to inform. In Metalclad v. Mexico, Tecmed, and Gold Reserve, the 
environmental authorities’ denial of the investor’s application for a permit without 
previously consulting the investor was held by the tribunals as a violation of the 
investor’s right to be heard. 
Metalclad concerned the denial of a municipal permit for the construction 
of a hazardous waste landfill operated by the foreign investor Metalclad. In the 
assessment of the FET standard, the tribunal noted that “the permit was denied at a 
meeting of the Municipal Town Council of which Metalclad received no notice, to 
which it received no invitation, and at which it was given no opportunity to 
appear.”152 
Similarly, in Tecmed, the tribunal held that the National Ecology Institute 
of Mexico (“INE”) failed to inform Tecmed of its defaults and irregularities prior 
to denying the renewal of its permit, which prevented Tecmed from “being able to 
express its position and to agree with INE about the measures required to cure the 
defaults.”153 
In Gold Reserve, the tribunal considered the deprivation of the investor’s 
right to be heard as proof of the host state’s bad faith. The Gold Reserve tribunal 
found that Venezuela issued the Revocation Order, which declared the “absolute 
nullity” of the Construction Permit for environmental reasons, without allowing the 
investor an opportunity to be heard.154 From this conduct, the tribunal inferred that 
the only reasonable explanation would be that the Revocation Order was 
determined by political objectives.155 
4. Transparency 
Another important element in the FET standard related to due process is 
the transparency requirement. In relatively early cases, such as Metalcald and 
Tecmed, the tribunals adopted an absolute transparency standard. For instance, the 
Metalclad tribunal requires that “all relevant legal requirements” must be “readily 
known to all affected investors” with “no room for doubt or uncertainty.” 156 
Similarly, the Tecmed tribunal held that the host state should act in a manner “free 
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor,” 
 
 152. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 91 (Aug. 
30, 2000). 
 153. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 162 (May 29, 2003). 
 154. Gold Reserve, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶ 
600 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 76. 
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so that the foreign investor “may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives.”157 Subsequent to Metalclad and 
Tecmed, most tribunals abandoned the absolute transparency standard. In Plama v. 
Bulgaria, Chemtura, and Al Tamimi, the tribunals, taking into account the good 
faith of the host state,158 held that mere uncertainty in environmental law,159 the 
government’s unspecific notice of relevant information during environmental 
regulatory process,160 or inconsistent representations by the governmental 
officials,161 did not constitute a violation of the transparency standard. The 
tribunals in Plama and Chemtura also took into account the due diligence of the 
foreign investor in the assessment of transparency.162 Accordingly, there is a 
general trend in the investment jurisprudence towards a less strict transparency 
requirement, which contributes to the reconciliation between the foreign investor’s 
legitimate interests and the host state’s environmental regulation. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE FET 
ASSESSMENT 
Today, states increasingly bear stringent international environmental 
commitments, and accordingly, are required to update their domestic 
environmental law to ensure the enforcement of new environmental standards. 
However, the change of law by host states to fulfill international environmental 
commitments might frustrate the foreign investors’ expectations at the time of their 
investments, which could result in a potential violation of the FET clause. The 
question is whether and to what extent a tribunal should take into account the host 
state’s international environmental commitments during the assessment of the FET 
standard. 
A. Conflict Clauses Concerning International Environmental Law in 
Investment Treaties 
A small number of investment treaties provide a conflict clause to solve a 
potential inconsistency between the treaty provisions and the requirements under 
international environmental law. 
In S.D. Myers v. Canada, the tribunal applied Article 104163 and Annex 
104.1164 of NAFTA to reconcile a potential inconsistency between NAFTA and 
 
 157. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 154, 
167. 
 158. Plama Consortium, Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 218 (Aug. 
27, 2008); Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 147 (Aug. 2, 2010); Adel A 
Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶ 399 (Nov. 3, 2015). 
 159. Plama Consortium, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 220. 
 160. Chemtura Corp., Award, ¶ 147. 
 161. Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, ¶¶ 397, 399. 
 162. Plama Consortium, Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 221; Chemtura Corp., Award, 
¶¶ 149–50. 
 163. Article 104 of the NAFTA provides: 
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set out in: 
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several environmental treaties. The case concerned a U.S. investor’s claim that 
Canada’s ban on the export of the polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”), a highly toxic 
substance, had violated the FET clause in NAFTA. The tribunal analyzed two 
environmental treaties prescribed in Article 104 and Annex 104.1: (1) The 1986 
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste 
(the “Transboundary Agreement”); and (2) the 1989 Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 
(the “Basel Convention”). 
The Transboundary Agreement was a bilateral agreement concluded by 
Canada and the United States governing the transboundary movement of hazardous 
waste. It has been added into Annex 104.1 of NAFTA, and thus has supremacy 
over the NAFTA provisions in case of any inconsistency between them, provided 
that the host state has chosen an implementation measure that is least inconsistent 
with NAFTA. However, after an analysis of the text of the Transboundary 
Agreement, the tribunal concluded that the agreement “does not give a party . . . 
absolute freedom to exclude the import or export of hazardous waste simply by 
enacting whatever national laws it chooses.”165 Accordingly, the tribunal held that 
Canada’s export ban was inconsistent with the Transboundary Agreement. 
The tribunal then turned to the Basel Convention. Canada argued that its 
export ban was enacted to comply with the obligations in the Basel Convention. 
However, since the Basel Convention had not been ratified by the United States at 
the time of the case, it did not fall within the scope of Article 104, which 
recognizes the supremacy of the Basel Convention in the case of its inconsistency 
with NAFTA on the condition that the Basel Convention has been ratified by 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States.166 Moreover, the tribunal found that 
Canada did not choose an alternative that was least inconsistent with the NAFTA 
provisions, and thus could not be justified under Article 104 of NAFTA. 
 
a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at 
Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended June 22, 1979, b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990, c) the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, done at Basel, March 22, 1989, on its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and the United 
States, or d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1, such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency, provided that where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably 
available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least 
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement. 
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to an agreement 
referred to in paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement. 
 164. Two bilateral environmental agreements are set out in Annex 104.1: 
1. The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed at Ottawa, October 28, 
1986. 
2. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation 
for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, signed at La Paz, Baja 
California Sur, August 14, 1983. 
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The importance of a conflict clause should not be overestimated. Only a 
small number of investment treaties have conflict clauses addressing the parties’ 
international environmental obligations, and many of these conflict clauses, unlike 
Article 104 of NAFTA, do not provide a specific methodology for solving a 
potential inconsistency between international investment and environmental 
obligations.167 In such circumstances, the tribunal may need to refer to the rules in 
general international law to reconcile the tension between the obligations under 
International Investment Law and International Environmental Law which will be 
addressed in the next two sections. 
B. Reference to International Environmental Law through Systematic 
Interpretation of Investment Treaties 
The investment tribunal may adopt a systematic interpretation of an 
investment treaty if the International Environmental Law (“IEL”) in question is 
applicable to both the host state and the foreign investor’s home state. According to 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), a 
treaty shall be interpreted with “any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties,” taken into account.168 This provision provides an 
opportunity for the tribunal to interpret the FET standard with a consideration of 
the host state’s obligations under international environmental law, including 
conventional international law, such as environmental treaties ratified by both 
parties, and customary international law, such as the obligations of preventing 
transboundary pollution169 and of conducting an EIA when an activity may cause a 
significant adverse transboundary impact.170 
In S.D. Myers, the tribunal interpreted the NAFTA provisions with 
reference to the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(“NAAEC”), which is a side agreement with NAFTA addressing NAFTA parties’ 
environmental obligations. Based on the objectives and the requirements of 
NAAEC, the tribunal concluded that NAFTA provisions should be interpreted 
according to three general principles: first, “[p]arties have the right to establish 
high levels of environmental protection. They are not obliged to compromise their 
standards merely to satisfy the political or economic interests of other states;” 
second, “[p]arties should avoid creating distortions to trade;” and third, 
“environmental protection and economic development can and should be mutually 
 
 167. VIÑUALES, at 138-140. 
 168. Article 31(3)(c) is part of Article 31 of the VCLT, which together with Article 32, form a 
customary international law rules of interpretation of treaties. Article 31(1) provides that “[a] treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” After a definition of the term “context” 
in Article 31(2), Article 31(3) states that: “There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context . . . [a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 169. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 
14, ¶ 193 (Apr. 20) (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 241–42, ¶ 29 (July 8). 
 170. Id. ¶ 204. 
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supportive.”171 Accordingly, the tribunal struck a balance between the host state’s 
investment and environmental obligations, holding that: 
In the Tribunal’s view, these principles are consistent with the express 
provisions of the Transboundary Agreement and the Basel Convention. A logical 
corollary of them is that where a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental 
protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged 
to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open trade. This corollary also 
is consistent with the language and the case law arising out of the WTO family of 
agreements.172 
On the other hand, in Glamis Gold, the tribunal failed to take into account 
a relevant environmental treaty concluded by both disputing parties in the 
interpretation of the FET provision of NAFTA. The Glamis Gold case concerned a 
Canadian mining project located in a culturally sensitive area in the United States 
where there existed designated Native American sites. The investor argued that the 
U.S. federal government’s denial of the project’s Plan of Operation (“POO”) based 
on the strict “undue impairment” standard, which was newly enacted in a solicitor’s 
M-Opinion, frustrated its legitimate expectations based on the pre-existing mining 
law that adopts the relatively less strict “unnecessary or undue degradation” 
standard. Recognizing that the shift of standards was a significant change that 
surprised the claimant,173 the tribunal pointed out that the issue before it was 
“whether a lengthy, reasoned legal opinion violates customary international law 
because it changes, in an arguably dramatic way, a previous law or prior legal 
interpretation upon which an investor has based its reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations.”174 The tribunal held: 
[I]t is not for an international tribunal to delve into the details of and 
justifications for domestic law. If Claimant, or any other party, believed that 
[Department of the Interior] Solicitor Leshy’s interpretation of the undue 
impairment standard was indeed incorrect, the proper venue for its challenge was 
domestic court. In the context of this claim, this Tribunal may consider only 
whether the M-Opinion occasioned ‘a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, 
blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a 
manifest lack of reasons.175 
Based on this deference to the host state’s domestic legislation and by 
adopting a high bar for the violation of the FET standard, the tribunal concluded 
that the United States’s change of its environmental standard did not violate the 
FET clause. 
In the “factual summary” part of the award, under the subtitle of 
“domestic regulatory landscape,” the tribunal addressed the United States’s 
obligations under the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural Property and Natural Heritage (“World Heritage Convention”), as well as 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 
 
 171. S.D. Myers, Inc., UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 220. 
 172. Id. ¶ 221. 
 173. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 759 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009). 
 174. Id. ¶ 761. 
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350 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 58 
(“UNESCO”) 1968 Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural 
Property Endangered by Public or Private Works. 176 UNESCO’s 
Recommendations may not constitute “rules of international law” under Article 
31(3)(c). However, the World Heritage Convention, to which both Canada and the 
United States are parties, should have been taken into account by the tribunal in its 
interpretation of the NAFTA FET provision. Unfortunately, the tribunal did not 
include any further discussion of these instruments during its analysis of the case. 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is applicable only if the relevant rules of 
international law in question is applicable to both parties to the treaty. As a result, 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is not applicable to the dispute where the host state 
changes its environmental law to fulfill an obligation under an environmental 
treaty, to which the foreign investor’s home state is not a party. For example, as 
mentioned above, in Unglaube, Costa Rica expropriated the German investors’ 
properties to build a national park to protect sea turtles, which is in compliance 
with its obligations under the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles. However, since Germany is not a Party to this 
convention, the tribunal is not obliged to take into account this convention in the 
interpretation of the Cost Rica-Germany BIT. Neither can Article 31(3)(c) be 
applied when the host state follows an environmental standard in an environmental 
treaty to which the host state itself is not a party. An illustrative example is 
Chemtura, in which Canada adopted a Special Review of the U.S. investor’s 
lindane products, a hazardous insecticide. Although Canada’s conduct was in line 
with the requirement of a restrictive use of lindane under the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (“OSPAR 
Convention”), a systematic interpretation could not be applied since Canada was 
not a party to the OSPAR Convention. Nonetheless, in these circumstances, IEL 
may still play a role in investment arbitration by proving the existence of 
international consensus on a particular environmental issue, and accordingly, the 
tribunals may determine the good faith and scientific rationality of the challenged 
environmental measure. 
C. International Environmental Law as a Proof of International Consensus 
on an Environmental Issue 
The Chemtura case is a typical example in which the tribunal considered 
the development of international environmental law as evidence of the host state’s 
good faith. The case concerned Canada’s Special Review of a U.S. investor’s 
products that contained lindane. The investor argued that Canada violated the FET 
standard because its Special Review was conducted for a trade irritant rather than 
for health and environmental considerations.177 Canada contended that the Special 
Review of lindane products was undertaken based on legitimate considerations in 
accordance with Canada’s international obligations under the Aarhus Protocol, 
which restricts the use of lindane.178 In order to examine the real intent of Canada 
in launching the review, the tribunal noted that it “cannot ignore the fact that 
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 177. Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can. UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 133 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
 178. Id. ¶ 131. 
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lindane has raised increasingly serious concerns both in other countries and at the 
international level since the 1970s.”179 The tribunal listed the international 
conventions, including the Aarhus Protocol to the Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (“LRTAP Convention”), the OSPAR Convention and 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, all of which require a 
restriction of the use of lindane.180 The tribunal thus held that “this broader factual 
context is relevant in assessing” the claimant’s argument that Canada launched the 
review process in bad faith.181 
The tribunal particularly analyzed Canada’s obligation of restricting uses 
of lindane and reassessing lindane under the Aarhus Protocol. The tribunal noted 
that “Annex II of the Aarhus Protocol expressly provides that ‘[a]ll restricted uses 
of lindane shall be reassessed under the Protocol no later than two years after the 
date of entry in force.’”182 The tribunal then relied on the several Canadian 
environmental officials’ testimonies indicating that Canada conducted the Special 
Review to meet its commitments during the negotiation of the Aarhus Protocol.183 
These testimonies also showed that Canada’s international commitments were 
limited to a review of lindane and that Canada did not commit to banning lindane 
prior to such a review.184 As a result, the tribunal denied the claimant’s argument 
that the Special Review was conducted to reach the foregone conclusion that 
lindane should be banned.185 Based on this evidence, the tribunal concluded that 
Canada did not launch the Special Review of lindane in bad faith.186 It held that 
“the evidence on the record does not show bad faith or disingenuous conduct on the 
part of Canada. Quite the contrary, it shows that the Special Review was 
undertaken by the PMRA [Canada’s Pest Management Regulatory Agency] in 
pursuance of its mandate and as a result of Canada’s international obligations.”187 
However, the Chemtura approach of considering the host state’s 
international environmental obligations in the FET assessment has not been 
adopted by some other tribunals. As one example, the tribunal in the S.D. Myers 
case did not take into account Canada’s international environmental commitments 
in the analysis of Canada’s intent. In this case, Canada’s ban on the export of the 
Polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”), a highly toxic substance, was challenged by the 
U.S. investor as a violation of the FET standard. Canada argued that the purpose of 
the export ban of the PCBs was to comply with Canada’s obligation under the 
Basel Convention (to which Canada was a party, while the United States was not) 
requiring the restriction of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. 
However, the tribunal denied this argument, holding that Canada’s policy was 
shaped “to a very great extent” by the intent to protect its domestic PCB disposal 
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companies.188 The tribunal made this decision mainly based on the statements of 
several Canadian environmental officials saying that the export ban would not 
contribute to environmental protection but would benefit domestic economics.189 
This evidence, the tribunal held, indicated that Canada’s export ban of the PCBs 
was “intended primarily to protect the Canadian PCB disposal industry from U.S. 
competition.”190 Thus, the tribunal found “no legitimate environmental reason for 
introducing the ban,”191 without any further analysis of Canada’s obligations under 
the Basel Convention. 
For another example, the Unglaube tribunal hardly considered Costa 
Rica’s international environmental obligations during the FET assessment. The 
investors argued that the change in the boundaries of the park and the construction 
of a “buffer zone” outside such boundaries had frustrated its reasonable 
expectations protected by the FET provision. Costa Rica maintained that all of its 
actions were to protect the natural environment for its citizens as well as the 
endangered leatherback turtles, which was in compliance with its obligation under 
the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles.192 The Unglaube tribunal dismissed the investors’ claim by according 
deference to the host state’s domestic regulation and by setting up a high bar for 
violating the FET clause. The tribunal held: 
[T]o prove a breach of the standard, a claimant must show more than mere 
legal error. Instead, as stated by the Saluka Tribunal, the evidence must establish 
actions or decisions which are ‘manifestly inconsistent, non-transparent, [or] 
unreasonable (i.e., unrelated to some rational policy) . . . Where, however, a valid 
public policy does exist, and especially where the action or decision was taken 
relates to the State’s responsibility ‘for the protection of public health, safety, 
morals or welfare, as well as other functions related to taxation and police powers 
of states,’ such measures are accorded a considerable measure of deference in 
recognition of the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters with their 
borders.193 
However, the tribunal did not discuss the Inter-American Convention for 
the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, which Costa Rica considered as a 
basis for all of its actions.194 
 
 188. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 162 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
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16, 2012). 
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 194. This is surprising since the tribunal agreed with the Duke Energy decision, which stated that the 
assessment of the legitimacy of the investor’s expectations “must take into account all circumstances, 
including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural 
and historical conditions prevailing in the host State.” Id. ¶ 249. Costa Rica’s international 
environmental commitment is of course one important factor among the should-be-considered “all 
circumstances.” 
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D. Conclusion 
It has been widely recognized that the FET provision is not designed to 
prohibit the host state from changing its domestic law. For the same reason, the 
FET provision should not prohibit the host state’s change of law to fulfill its 
international environmental commitments. Despite this apparent conclusion, it is 
not easy to find a balance point between the protection of the foreign investor’s 
legitimate expectations and the host state’s right, and also obligation, to comply 
with its IEL obligations. The tribunals’ approaches in this regard can be divided 
into three categories: (1) When the investment treaty in question has a conflict 
clause dealing with such tension (such as Article 104 of NAFTA), the tribunal has 
resorted to the conflict clause to see whether it is applicable to the current case, as 
with the S.D. Myers tribunal; (2) When there is no conflict clause in the investment 
treaty or the conflict clause is inapplicable, and the IEL in question obliges both 
parties to the investment treaty, the tribunals have adopted inconsistent opinions on 
whether to take into account IEL in the interpretation of the investment treaty. The 
S.D. Myers tribunal took into account a relevant environmental treaty in the 
interpretation of NAFTA while the Glamis Gold tribunal did not; and (3) When 
there is no conflict clause in the investment treaty or the conflict clause is 
inapplicable, and the IEL in question obliges only the host state, the tribunals have 
adopted different approaches regarding the application of the IEL: although the 
Chemtura tribunal considered the host state’s obligations under the IEL as a proof 
of a good faith underlying the challenged measure, the tribunals in S.D. Myers and 
the Unglaube did not do so. 
V. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION UNDER THE FET STANDARD 
The aforementioned investment jurisprudence has exhibited a status of 
chaos concerning the assessment of the host states’ environmental measures under 
the FET standard. The tribunals have adopted four different models of the general 
threshold of the FET standard in environment-related investment arbitration. 
Within each model, the tribunals have adopted diverse interpretations of the 
subcomponents of the FET standard. Adding to the complexity of the picture, the 
tribunals have adopted various approaches with respect to whether and how to 
account for the host states’ international environmental obligations in determining 
the legitimacy of the states’ activities under the FET standard. Such chaotic 
jurisprudence sends out disordered and confusing signals to host states, who, before 
enacting domestic environmental legislation or signing environmental treaties, need 
to ensure that their environmental regulation will not lead to a violation of their 
commitments under investment treaties that may result in substantive amounts of 
compensation. This calls for a clarification of the current blurred line between a 
non-compensable legitimate environmental regulation and a compensable illegal 
infringement of foreign investment. 
In this part, the author proposes an integrated methodology to draw this 
line, with due consideration of both the foreign investor’s economic interests and 
the host state’s environmental interests. The methodology is, without a specific 
commitment made by a host state to a foreign investor, the host state’s 
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environmental regulation does not violate the FET standard, as long as such 
regulation is reasonable to achieve a genuine environmental objective and is 
applied non-discriminatorily and with due process. It consists of five elements: 
good faith, reasonableness, procedural propriety, non-discrimination, and no 
specific commitments. 
A. Good Faith: The Challenged Measure Must Be for a Real Environmental 
Objective 
The first element is that the challenged measure must be conducted in 
good faith for the purpose of environmental protection. The tribunal should make 
an objective assessment of the real intent underlying the measure, in order to 
distinguish between an environmental protection measure that has an incidental 
adverse impact on foreign investments and an infringement targeting foreign 
investment disguised by an environmental name. 
The regulatory intent of the host state has been an important element 
considered by the tribunals in the FET assessment, although bad faith per se is not 
required for a violation of the FET principle.195 Some tribunals held that good faith 
is a component of the FET standard. In Tecmed, the tribunal held that FET “is an 
expression and part of the bona fide principle recognized in international law.”196 
Similarly, in Biwater, the tribunal considered good faith as one component of the 
FET standard, together with other components such as protection of legitimate 
expectations, transparency, consistency, and non-discrimination.197 The Saluka 
tribunal and the Gold Reserve tribunal also recognized “bona fide” as one 
requirement of the FET standard.198 Other tribunals held that the good faith of the 
host state can justify a violation of the FET principle. As stated by the GAMI 
tribunal, “Proof of a good faith effort by the Government to achieve the objectives 
of its laws and regulations may counter-balance instances of disregard of legal or 
regulatory requirements.”199 The tribunal in Yuri Bogdanov v. Moldova also held 
that “protecting the environment in a legitimate aim and legislation to that effect 
has an objective and reasonable justification. This also means that the imposition of 
charges of this kind in itself can in no way violate the fair and equitable 
standard.”200 Some other tribunals considered the host state’s intent as a context in 
which the FET standard should be assessed. In Chemtura, for example, the tribunal 
repeatedly stated that the “good faith” of the Canadian government to protect 
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human health and the environment was a “general context” in which the tribunal 
decided the legitimacy of the government’s specific actions.201 The methodology 
suggested in this article is similar to the second approach: it considers the “good 
faith” of the host state’s regulation as one of the criteria for justifying a violation of 
FET. 
Despite its importance, detecting the real intent of domestic decision-
makers is by no means easy, since a single governmental policy is often framed by 
many different people with differing perspectives, policy considerations, partisan 
political factors and career concerns.202 Given these difficulties, the tribunal should 
determine the intent underlying an ostensibly environmental measure through an 
objective assessment of that measure. 
First, the tribunal should determine the motivation underlying a 
challenged measure based on “the record of the evidence as a whole,”203 rather than 
simply relying on subjective representations of individual officials. The tribunal in 
Gold Reserve instead examined “a stream of statements and public 
announcements” made by “the highest levels of authority”204 of Venezuela, 
including President Chávez,205 and concluded that these statements and 
announcements indicated that Venezuela’s termination of the investor’s mining 
concessions was not for an environmental purpose, but for implementing a new 
national policy of recovering the country’s mining resources by putting them under 
the control of socialism for national development.206 By contrast, the Glamis Gold 
tribunal was cautious not to rely on individual representations to determine the 
intent of legislation.207 In order to determine whether the challenged California 
legislature had a discriminatory intent to “target” the investor’s mining project, the 
tribunal relied on the language and drafting history of the legislation as well as the 
realities of the mining industry in California.208 
Second, the tribunal should determine the primary, rather than incidental, 
intent of the host state.209 States usually adopt one measure to achieve multiple 
objectives. For instance, in Yuri Bogdanov, Moldova’s challenged environmental 
charges on the import of environmentally harmful goods served both as an 
environmental regulation and as a trade restriction. The tribunal held that those 
charges constituted an environmental regulation which could be justified under the 
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FET provision since its “primary intention” is environmental protection rather than 
trade regulation.210 
B. Reasonableness: The Challenged Measure Must Be Reasonable to Achieve 
the Environmental Objective 
The second element is that the challenged measure must be reasonable to 
achieve its environmental objective. A “reasonable” environmental measure should 
not be made arbitrarily; rather, it should be made based on scientific evidence. 
First, the tribunal should examine the scientific bases underlying the 
challenged environmental measures. A controversial issue here is whether and to 
what extent the tribunal should accord deference to the host state in making 
decisions related to scientific determinations. For instance, the tribunals in Glamis 
Gold and Chemtura refused to delve into the scientific bases of the environmental 
measures. In Glamis Gold, the tribunal agreed with the United States that “[i]t is 
simply not this Tribunal’s task to become archaeologists and ethnographers and to 
draw a definitive conclusion as to the location of the Trail of Dreams.”211 In 
particular, the tribunal noted the following: 
It is not the role of this Tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant 
its own judgment of underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified 
domestic agency. Indeed, our only task is to decide whether Claimant has 
adequately proven that the agency’s review and conclusions exhibit a gross denial 
of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, 
evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons so as to rise to the level of a 
breach of the customary international law standard embedded in Article 1105.212 
The Chemtura tribunal accorded deference to the host state in certain 
“highly specialized domain involving scientific and public policy 
determinations.”213 The Chemtura tribunal noted that the assessment of “whether 
the protection granted under [Article 1105] is lessened by a margin of appreciation 
granted to domestic regulatory agencies and, if so, to what extent” should be 
conducted “in concreto”; it should not be “an abstract assessment circumscribed by 
a legal doctrine about the margin of appreciation of specialized regulatory 
agencies.”214 In assessment of whether the Special Review of lindane conducted by 
Canada had violated the FET clause, the tribunal “notes at the outset that it is not 
its task to determine whether certain uses of lindane are dangerous, whether in 
general or in the Canadian context” and that “the rule of a Chapter 11 Tribunal is 
not to second-guess the correctness of the science-based decision-making of highly 
specialized national regulatory agencies.” 215 
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In regard to the claimant’s argument that “the scientific basis for the 
outcome of the Special Review was insufficient,”216 the tribunal pointed out again 
that “it is not for the Tribunal to judge the correctness or adequacy of the scientific 
results of the Special Review, not even those questioned by the Board of 
Review.”217 The tribunal also agreed with the testimony of the expert witness 
presented by Canada, who confirmed that “the PMRA conclusions were within 
acceptable scientific parameters,” 218 and that PMRA has reasonable discretion to 
adopt a relatively high safety standard in its risk assessment of the use of 
lindane.219 In the tribunal’s view, the scientific divergence between the foreign 
investor and Canada “cannot in and of itself serve as a basis for a finding of breach 
of Article 1105 of NAFTA.”220 
This “no-second-guessing” approach adopted in Glamis Gold and 
Chemtura is questionable. Granted, the host state should be accorded deference to 
exercise its sovereign rights to decide domestic matters, and in this sense, the 
investment tribunal should not be granted “an open-ended mandate to second-guess 
government decision-making.”221 However, the state’s exercise of sovereignty 
should be in conformity with its obligations under international investment 
agreements. It is one thing that the investment tribunal acts as a court of appeal 
adjudicating domestic measures, while it is another that the tribunal assesses the 
reasonableness of a measure to conclude whether it is “fair and equitable” under 
international law. The former should be prohibited, and the latter is within the 
scope of authority of investment tribunals. 
Two recent cases have provided illustrative examples of how international 
adjudicators have assessed the scientific bases of governmental measures in a way 
that falls within the authority of international tribunals rather than of “a court of 
appeal.” 
The first one is Philip Morris v. Uruguay, which concerns investors 
registered in Switzerland investing in the tobacco industry in Uruguay.222 The 
investors’ core claim was that Uruguay’s tobacco-control measures, including a 
single representation requirement, prohibiting more than one variant of cigarette 
within a single cigarette brand (the “SPR”) and a requirement increasing the size of 
graphic health warnings on cigarette packages (the “80/80 Regulation”), violated 
the BIT for their harmful impact on the trademarks of the investors’ cigarette 
products.223 In the assessment of the FET clause, the tribunal held that substantial 
deference should be accorded to the government and that the tribunal should not be 
a court of appeal: 
[T]he present case concerns a legislative policy decision taken against the 
background of a strong scientific consensus as to the lethal effects of tobacco. 
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Substantial deference is due in that regard to national authorities’ decisions as to 
the measures which should be taken to address an acknowledged and major public 
health problem. The fair and equitable treatment standard is not a justiciable 
standard of good government, and the tribunal is not a court of appeal. Article 3(2) 
does not dictate, for example, that a 50% health warning requirement is fair 
whereas an 80% requirement is not. In one sense an 80% requirement is arbitrary in 
that it could have been 60% or 75% or for that matter 85% or 90%. Some limit had 
to be set, and the balance to be struck between conflicting considerations was very 
largely a matter for the government.224 
But according deference to Uruguay’s public health regulation does not 
deprive the tribunal’s rights of assessing the scientific basis of the regulation. To 
determine the investors’ claim that the challenged measures were arbitrary due to 
an absence of scientific evidence of their effectiveness, 225 the tribunal broadly 
considered scientific evidence “at the international level,” including the tobacco 
industry’s record, a judgment by the United States court, submissions by a 
Canadian NGO, a World Health Organization (“WHO”) report on “labeling and 
packaging in Brazil,” as well as published international journals. 226 Particularly, 
the tribunal adopted the Amicus Briefs submitted by the WHO and the Pan 
American Health Organization, which recognized the reasonableness and 
effectiveness of the challenged measures.227 The tribunal also pointed out that, 
since Uruguay’s measures had been adopted to implement the obligations under the 
2003 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”), “there was no 
requirement for Uruguay to perform additional studies or to gather further evidence 
in support of the Challenged Measures.”228 
The ICJ in the case Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), also 
delved into the scientific basis of the challenged Japanese program. In this case, the 
issue before the ICJ is whether the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research 
Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (“JARPA II”) is conducted “for the 
purpose of scientific research,” which forms an exemption from the obligations 
under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. Japan argued 
that “matters of scientific policy cannot be properly appraised by the Court” and 
that “the role of the Court therefore is ‘to secure the integrity of the process by 
which the decision is made, [but] not to review the decision itself.’”229 However, 
the court adopted an “objective” standard of review in determining whether Japan’s 
whaling program fell within “a special permit authorizing the killing, taking and 
treating of whales” under the Convention.230 This objective standard of review 
includes the following two parts: 
[F]irst, whether the programme under which these activities occur 
involves scientific research. Secondly, the Court will consider if the killing, taking 
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and treating of whales is ‘for purposes of’ scientific research by examining 
whether, in the use of lethal methods, the programme’s design and implementation 
are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives.231 
In particular, the court stressed that its task is not to resolve whaling 
policy with respect to which the international community has divergent views, but 
to examine whether the special permits granted in Japan’s whaling program fell 
within the scope of the scientific research exemption clause in the Convention.232 
The Philip Morris case and the Whaling case have provided illustrative 
examples in which the international adjudicators made an objective assessment of 
the reasonableness of states’ domestic measures, in a way that the international 
adjudicators did not act as a “court of appeal” or illegitimately interfered with 
domestic police powers. 
It is noteworthy that the tribunal need not examine the actual effects of the 
challenged measure to determine its reasonableness. This is because, as noted by 
the WTO Appeal Body, whether a measure is effective in achieving its 
environmental aims may only be seen years or even decades after the adoption of 
the measure.233 The tribunal in Philip Morris also held that it was unnecessary to 
take an “actual effect” test when determining the reasonableness of the challenged 
measure: 
[w]hether or not the SPR was effective in addressing public perceptions 
about tobacco safety and whether or not the companies were seeking, or had in the 
past sought, to mislead the public on the point, it is sufficient in light of the 
applicable standard to hold that the SPR was an attempt to address a real public 
health concern, that the measure taken was not disproportionate to that concern and 
that it was adopted in good faith.234 
C. Procedural Propriety: The Challenged Measure Must Be Implemented in 
Due Process 
The third condition is that the environmental measure must be 
implemented in a fair procedure. A reasonable environmental measure may 
constitute a violation of the FET standard if the measure is not implemented in due 
process or is applied in a discriminatory manner. Due process is a vital element of 
the FET standard, and in a number of cases, procedural shortcomings have 
contributed to a violation of the FET.235 As discussed in Part IV, The host state 
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should exercise its legitimate right of environmental protection with due process, 
including ensuring the impartiality of decision-making, protecting the foreign 
investor’s right to be heard, and refraining from serious delay in regulatory 
processes. 
First, the partiality of an environmental decision-making agency may 
amount to a violation of due process. For example, in Bilcon, the foreign investor 
claimed that Canada’s selection of the members of an environmental review panel 
was biased. However, in this case, the tribunal found that the evidence provided by 
the foreign investor did not prove any partiality of the panel members.236 In Merrill 
& Ring v. Canada, the foreign investors claimed that an environmental advisory 
committee, whose recommendations had no binding effects on the government’s 
decision but were usually adopted by the government, was partial. In this case, the 
members of the tribunal were in disagreement as to whether the partiality of an 
“advisory committee” amounted to a violation of the FET standard: some stressed 
that the advisory committee’s recommendations had a predominant influence on 
governmental decisions,237 while others insisted that the advisory committee’s 
impact on the government was limited because the government did not have “a 
closed mind.”238 Another example is Gold Reserve, in which the tribunal held that a 
procedural defect of terminating two different concessions in the same process 
violated the FET standard.239 
Second, an undue delay in the environmental decision-making process 
may violate the due process requirement. The tribunal has adopted different 
approaches with respect to the standard of review of a delay: the Gold Reserve 
tribunal adopted a pro-investor approach, holding that a delay in granting an 
environmental permit, which had a harmful impact on the foreign investor, was 
“contrary to the BIT standard.” 240 However, the tribunal failed to consider other 
criteria such as the complexity of administration, the host state’s intent or the 
investor’s due diligence. The Glamis Gold tribunal and the Bilcon tribunal, on the 
other hand, adopted a pro-host state approach. They held that the delay in the host 
state’s environmental regulation did not amount to a breach of FET, mainly 
considering that the host states were dealing with complicated issues.241 This 
approach is also questionable since it will easily lead to an unlimited deference to a 
host state tackling with complex administrative problems. For example, in Glamis 
Gold, the tribunal simply justified a more than nine-year delay of environmental 
review for the reason that “this was a particularly complicated, contested issue in 
which numerous parties took an interest and the federal government was quite 
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aware of the likelihood, if not imminence, of litigation and therefore its need to be 
extraordinarily careful in its review and decision-making processes.”242 
A better approach would be to take account of multiple factors, including 
the complexity of administration, the intent of the host state, and the due diligence 
of the foreign investor. A typical example was the Chemtura case. In this case, the 
tribunal not only carefully examined the causal link between the delay in question 
and the damages suffered by the foreign investor, but also took into account the 
host state’s good faith, the investor’s contribution to the delay, and a comparison 
between the host state and the investor’s home state with respect to the amount of 
time they normally spend for regulating such issue. 243 
Third, a failure to ensure the host state’s right to be heard in 
environmental decision-making may violate the due process requirement. For 
example, the tribunals in Metalclad and Tecmed in their assessment of the FET 
standard took into account the fact that the host states failed to inform the foreign 
investor before denying the investor’s application for a permit. In Gold Reserve, the 
tribunal held that the fact that the host state revoked a permit previously granted to 
the investor, without allowing the investor an opportunity to be heard, proved that 
such revocation was not for environmental reasons but for political reasons.244 
D. Non-discrimination: The Challenged Measure Must Be Implemented in a 
Non-discriminatory Manner 
In addition to the due process requirement, the challenged measure should 
also be applied generally, rather than discriminatorily, against the foreign investor. 
The Glamis Gold tribunal illustrated how to determine the general applicability of 
an environmental measure. In Glamis Gold, the California government enacted 
Senate Bill 22 (“SB 22”) to enable the previously passed Senate Bill 483 to become 
law, prohibiting the lead agency’s approval of a reclamation plan for operating hard 
rock surface mining if the operation was “located on, or within one mile of, any 
Native American sacred site and [was] located in an area of special concern.”245 
This bill permanently prevented the approval of the investor’s project located in 
sacred Native American areas.246 The investor argued that SB 22 targeted the 
investor’s project and was designed to make the project infeasible, which was 
discriminatory and arbitrary.247 The tribunal noted that it was clear that the 
investor’s project was on the minds of the California legislators drafting SB 22.248 
However, the tribunal found this implies two possibilities: one is that SB 22 indeed 
targeted the investor’s project; the other is that SB 22 was a bill of general 
application, addressing a larger class of projects with a general problem.249 The 
tribunal decided that SB 22 was in the latter category because SB 22 on its face 
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appeared to apply to not only present but also future mines that harm sacred 
sites.250 It is noteworthy that the tribunal set a threshold for a bill of general 
application: 
[W]hat are the requirements to be a bill of general application? Although 
not delving into the intricacies of domestic law and lawmaking, the Tribunal 
determines that likely characteristics of a law of general application would be that 
it is not strictly limited in time or geographic scope, and it is not crafted so as to 
exclude from its regulation all, or most, other similarly situated actors.251 
E. No Specific Commitments: The Host State Has Not Made Specific 
Commitments to the Foreign Investor 
Although the host state’s regulatory change is reasonable to achieve a 
genuine environmental purpose and is implemented with due process and in a non-
discriminatory manner, the host state may still violate the FET standard if it has 
made a specific commitment to the foreign investor stating that such change will 
not be made. This final condition of “no specific commitments” aims to protect the 
foreign investor’s legitimate expectations based on specific stabilization promises 
made by the host state. Many recent tribunals have held that the host state’s change 
of law does not constitute a violation of the FET standard unless the host state has 
made a specific stabilization assurance to the foreign investor.252 For example, the 
tribunal in Parkerings v. Lithuania held that “[s]ave for the existence of an 
agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing 
objectionable about the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at 
the time an investor made its investment.”253 Adopting the same approach, the 
tribunal in Yuri Bogdanov v. Moldova decided that the new legislation enacted by 
Moldova, which imposed an environmental charge on the foreign investor, did not 
breach the FET clause because the new legislation did not fall within the scope of 
the stabilization clause.254 However, it should be clarified that the host state’s 
promises made to the foreign investors with respect to not changing environmental 
law does not mean that the environmental legislative process will be frozen. The 
state can still change the law despite such promises, but it needs to compensate the 
foreign investor for the latter’s losses due to such change. 
CONCLUSION 
Investment jurisprudence has been inconsistent with respect to the 
assessment of the host state’s environmental regulation under the FET clause in 
investment treaties. On the one hand, the tribunals have crafted four different 
models of general threshold of the FET standard in environment-related investment 
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arbitration. On the other hand, the tribunals have established different standards of 
review for each specific subelement of FET. Moreover, in the cases where the host 
state’s challenged measure is enacted for implementing international environmental 
obligations, the tribunals have adopted diverse approaches regarding the role of 
international environmental law in investment arbitration. To cure this legal 
uncertainty, this article proposes an integrated methodology to assess the host 
state’s environmental regulation under the FET standard, that is, unless there exist 
specific commitments made by the host state to the foreign investor in a contrary 
manner, the host state’s environmental regulation does not violate the FET 
standard, as long as such regulation is reasonable to achieve genuine environmental 
objectives and is applied non-discriminatorily and with due process. 
 
